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Guided by the spatial theory of voting, this study examines the influence of state 
legislator policy preferences, higher education interest groups, and other variables on 
state funding to higher education.  Using data from all 50 U.S. states over a period of 
twelve years, this study utilizes a dynamic panel model with Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) techniques to examine how a number of independent variables 
influence state funding for higher education.  Dynamic panel modeling with GMM 
techniques addresses methodological limitations of prior research by accurately 
examining a lag of the dependent variable included as an independent variable while 
accounting for unobserved state-specific fixed-effects, time-related fixed-effects, and 
possible endogeneity of one or more of the independent variables. 
 The results of this study indicate that more conservative state legislatures are 
associated with lower levels of funding to higher education while more liberal 
  
legislatures are associated with higher levels of funding.  Other variables, including prior 
year higher education appropriations, K-12 appropriations, gubernatorial strength, and the 
share of enrollment in private higher education are related to current year state 
appropriations to higher education.     
 The results from this study have a number of implications.  First, this study 
utilizes the spatial theory of voting, a theory which has never been previously utilized in 
higher education research, to guide the selection of political variables, including state 
legislator policy preferences.  Future research within political science and other academic 
disciplines can employ the spatial theory of voting to examine the influence of state 
legislator policy preferences on different policy outcomes.  Second, future researchers 
may consider employing dynamic fixed-effects panel modeling with GMM techniques 
when including a lag of the dependent as an independent variable. Third, future studies 
can utilize the newly developed measures of policy preferences to understand the 
influence of state legislator policy preferences on a variety of state level policy outcomes.  
Fourth, an understanding of the influences of higher education funding will allow 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
All public institutions of higher education in the U.S. depend upon state funding 
for construction, faculty and staff salaries, operating expenses, and other critical needs. 
However, state financial support has rapidly declined over the past three to four decades. 
Mortenson (2005) estimates that state support for higher education has declined 40% 
since 1978 and Jenny and Arbak (2004) found that state appropriations have decreased by 
$650 per student in the first few years of the 20th century.  Furthermore, state higher 
education appropriations per full time student (inflation-adjusted) fell to a 25 year low in 
2012 (SHEEO State  Higher Education Finance FY 2012).  In contrast to the decline in 
state support, there has been a 24% increase in tuition and fees at public colleges and 
universities from 2005 to 2010 (Trends in College Pricing, 2010).   
The aforementioned decreases in financial support to higher education have 
forced higher education institutions to make various budgetary decisions.  The Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) cites recent examples of increased faculty 
workloads, faculty and staff layoffs, scholarship eliminations, and other budget cuts to 
public colleges and universities across the nation (Johnson, 2011).  Additionally, 
increased tuition and decreased state financial support impose difficult decisions for state 
policymakers as they consider how to improve college attendance and completion.  For 
example, California public universities recently experienced a 20% decline in state 
funding and have been forced to reduce their enrollments and raise tuition (McMillan, 
2011).  These reductions in state financial support for higher education have prompted 
researchers to study what influences state higher education funding throughout the states. 
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Recent studies investigating state appropriations to higher education show that 
prior state appropriations to higher education and certain state characteristics are 
statistically significant predictors of state funding appropriations (e.g. McLendon, 2003; 
McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009). Similarly, the presence of competing budget items, 
such as corrections, K-12 funding, and health care crowd out funding for higher 
education within states (Kane, Orszag, & Apostolov, 2005; Okunade, 2004). 
Additionally, higher education governance structures, the political party of the governor, 
and gubernatorial power have been shown to influence higher education funding (e.g., 
Knott & Payne, 2003; McLendon et al., 2009).  Another variable, higher education 
interest groups, has also shown to be statistically significant in previous research 
assessing state funding for higher education (e.g., Tandberg, 2008).  Specifically, 
previous research has depicted that an increase in higher education interest groups 
positively influences state appropriations to higher education (e.g., Tandberg & Ness, 
2011).  Another variable, divided legislature, depicting whether a state had a unified or 
divided state legislature, also influences state appropriations to higher education 
(Tandberg, 2008).  Overall, prior appropriation levels, state characteristics, competing 
budget items, higher education governance structures, political party of the governor, 
gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and higher education interest groups are 
shown to influence higher education funding.  Additionally, scholars have begun to 
assess how political parties influence state funding for higher education (e.g., Tandberg, 
2007, 2009; Dar, 2012).    
Previous studies determined that Democratic governors and legislators within US 
states have funded postsecondary education at proportionally higher levels compared to 
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their Republican counterparts (Dar & Spence, 2011). This finding may seem intuitive 
because Democrats are typically associated with higher spending on social services, 
including higher education (Archibald & Feldman 2006; McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton 
2006).  However, not all members of the same political party, whether it is the 
Democratic or Republican Party, have the same policy preferences regarding state budget 
items, including higher education funding.  For example, a Democratic legislature in the 
Northeast US may have a different policy preference than a Democratic legislature in a 
southern state, causing a vastly different stance on higher education funding.  A recent 
study by Shor and McCarty (2011) determined that certain Democratic parties in the 
southern part of the US are, in fact, more conservative than Republican parties in the 
Northern US.  These results reported by Shor and McCarty (2011) indicate that there are 
different policy preferences within the Democratic or Republican parties across states.  
The different policy preferences within parties may help explain why Democrats in some 
states fund higher education at higher levels than Democrats in other states.  Studying 
how different policy preferences, within the US political parties, are associated with 
higher education funding can provide a more nuanced and detailed examination of how 
political variables influence state higher education funding.   
In order to study how different legislator policy preferences influence higher 
education funding, a variety of theoretical frameworks can be considered.  The majority 
of studies investigating the influences of state appropriations to higher education have 
utilized theories such as the policy innovation and diffusion framework (e.g., McLendon, 
2003; McLendon, Deaton, & Hearn, 2007; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005), the fiscal 
policy framework (e.g., Tandberg, 2006, 2007, 2010), or rational choice theories (e.g., 
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Weerts & Ronca, 2008; Doyle, 2007).   The theoretical frameworks found within these 
aforementioned studies come from a variety of disciplines.  However, only a few studies 
(e.g., Dar, 2012; Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998) have employed a framework grounded 
within political science and employed robust statistical techniques to study how political 
parties, and policy preferences within political parties, influence state appropriations to 
higher education. Frameworks grounded within political science can more appropriately 
guide studies seeking to assess how political factors influence policy outcomes.  
Therefore, this study utilizes a framework grounded within political science to examine 
how political factors influence higher education funding.  
Though a few recent higher education studies have begun to examine how 
political variables influence higher education funding, numerous scholars (e.g., 
McLendon et al., 2009) have pointed to the need for further research in this area.  
McLendon et al., (2009) presented a paper that outlined the need for further research and 
Tandberg (2008) recently called for additional research on how state politics affect state 
support for higher education. Tandberg (2008) found preliminary evidence that decisions 
made by elected officials during the political process influence higher education funding. 
Another study by Doyle (2007) points out that the research on the effects of politics on 
state policies for higher education is only at a starting point.  He writes that a variety of 
theoretical models have been utilized to study the politics of higher education, but further 
investigation is needed on other potential models.  Hossler, Lund, Ramin, Westfall, and 
Irish (1997) conducted a study in which the authors had difficulty determining the exact 
variables affecting state appropriations to higher education. They concluded that, similar 
to other literature on this topic, the size of the public postsecondary system and previous 
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levels of funding were the only significant variables shown to influence levels of state 
appropriations to higher education and that further studies are necessary.  In a different 
article, McLendon (2003) detailed the need for studies investigating the effect of politics 
on state appropriations to higher education.  He noted that few studies have tried to 
explain the relationship between politics and higher education spending and claims that 
there are vast limitations in the conceptual frameworks of previous studies.  Overall, the 
studies cited here show that there has been a preliminary analysis of how political 
variables influence funding for higher education.  However, many scholars have called 
for further research in this area. Specifically, there is a need to examine how policy 
preferences, within political parties, influence higher education funding.  Additionally, 
because the presence of higher education interest groups have been shown to influence 
state appropriations to higher education (e.g., Tandberg, 2008; Tandberg & Ness, 2011) 
there is a need to examine how policy preferences, interacting with higher education 
interest groups, influence state appropriations to higher education. 
 
Purpose 
Using the spatial theory of voting and advanced statistical techniques, this study 
examines the influence of state legislator policy preferences, higher education interest 
groups, and other variables on state funding to higher education. The limitations of 
previous research will be outlined to portray the need for a theoretical framework 
grounded within political science for this study. Although the theoretical framework 
within this study concentrates on how policy preferences influence state funding of 
higher education, other variables are taken into account.   
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First, this study examines how a set of variables found to be statistically 
significant in previous research influence higher education funding.  Second, study builds 
upon prior research by examining how state legislator policy preferences and state 
legislator policy preferences interacting with higher education interest groups influence 
state appropriations for higher education. 
 
Research Questions 
       This study intends to examine how state legislator policy preferences and higher 
education interest groups influence state appropriations to higher education, controlling 
for other variables.  The following research questions will be addressed: 
  
1. How do prior state appropriations to higher education, state 
characteristics, higher education governance systems, competing budget 
items, higher education interest groups, political party of the governors, 
gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and other unobservable 
variables influence state spending on higher education? 
 
2. Taking into account prior state appropriations to higher education, state 
characteristics, higher education governance systems, competing budget 
items, higher education interest groups, political party of the governors, 
gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and other unobservable 





3. Taking into account prior state appropriations to higher education, state 
characteristics, higher education governance systems, competing budget 
items, political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided 
legislature, and other unobservable variables, how do policy preferences 




A theoretical framework embedded within political science is most appropriate 
when studying the effects of policy preferences on policy outcomes.  One such theory, 
the spatial theory of voting, will be the theoretical framework guiding this research study. 
The spatial theory of voting posits that legislators evaluate policy alternatives and make 
policy decisions based on their own preferences (Enelow & Hinich, 1984).  Additionally, 
rather than simply classifying legislator policy preferences as dichotomous (Democratic 
or Republican), this framework describes policy preferences on a continuous scale.  Thus, 
the spatial theory of voting depicts how policy preferences differ for legislators within the 
same political party.  A continuous scale measuring policy preferences allows for a more 
extensive understanding of the political philosophies within and across U.S. states.  In 
summary, the spatial theory of voting assumes that legislators evaluate policy alternatives 
and make policy decisions based on their own preferences. 
A number of previous studies have utilized the spatial theory of voting to analyze 
legislative decision making (e.g., Bailey & Chang, 2001; Jenkins & Sala, 1998; McCarty 
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& Poole, 1995).   Previous studies have utilized the spatial theory of voting to analyze the 
influence of the policy preferences of US Presidents and Supreme Court Justices on 
legislative decision making (Bailey & Chang, 2001).  Other authors have employed this 
theory to assess the influence of policy preferences of the US Congress on legislative 
decision making (Poole & Rosenthal, 1987, 1991, 2001, 2007).  However, this 
framework has yet to be used in the field of higher education to guide studies examining 
the influence of policy preferences on state appropriations to higher education.   
There are multiple reasons for choosing the spatial theory of voting for this study. 
 First, researchers in political science often try to understand the reasons why policies are 
enacted, given the different political actors involved.  These actors can include governors, 
legislators, and interest groups.  As previously mentioned, many of these studies 
researching the effects of political actors on policy decisions employ the spatial theory of 
voting (e.g., Jenkins & Sala, 1998; McCarty & Poole, 1995). Within these studies, the 
authors determined the influence of political actors’ preferences on policy outcomes.  
Therefore, because the spatial theory of voting has been helpful in understanding political 
influences on policy decisions in other research, the spatial theory of voting will be used 
for this study.  Second, the spatial theory of voting has been chosen for this study given 
its effective use in past quantitative research.  Qualitative studies that assess how political 
factors influence policy use different theoretical frameworks, such as organizational 
theory (Kingdon, 1984), political systems perspective (Fischer, 1990; Wirt & Kirst, 
1972), and the power influence perspective (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976).  However, this 
study will utilize a large data set which contains variables from multiple states over 
multiple years, requiring the use of a quantitative method.  Other scholars have 
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effectively utilized the spatial theory of voting in previous quantitative research with 
similar datasets (e.g., McCarty and Poole, 1995).  In summary, this study will employ the 
spatial theory of voting given its effective use in prior quantitative studies examining the 




The dependent variable in this study is state appropriations to higher education 
per capita. This data is collected on an annual basis by Grapevine, a joint project of the 
Center for the Study of Education Policy at Illinois State University and the State Higher 
Education Executive Officers (Palmer, 2009), through the use of surveys that measure 
state tax support for higher education within each U.S. state.  The Grapevine survey 
measures tax appropriations to all sectors of higher education (public and private).  
Measuring state appropriations per capita allows for a comparative measurement across 
states of the relative proportion of state appropriations to higher education relative to the 
total state population. 
The independent variables within the study include: 1) prior year state 
appropriations to higher education, 2) state characteristics, which include: unemployment 
rate, tax and expenditure limitation laws, per capita total enrollment in higher education, 
and share of higher education enrollment in private institutions, 3) competing budget 
items, which include: K-12 expenditures per capita, Medicaid expenditures per capita, 
and prison expenditures per capita, 4) higher education governance systems, and 5) 
political variables, which include: state legislator policy preferences, political party of the 
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governors, gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, higher education interest groups, a 
variable comprising the interaction of state legislator policy preferences and higher 
education interest groups, political party of the governors, and gubernatorial strength.   
The independent variable, prior state appropriations to higher education will be 
represented as a lagged value of the dependent variable, current state appropriations to 
higher education.  The independent variables representing state characteristics, including 
unemployment rate, tax expenditure and limitation laws, per capital total enrollment in 
higher education, and share of higher education enrollment in private institutions are 
collected from a variety of sources, including; The United States Department of Labor’s 
Bureau of Labor Statistics to capture unemployment rates (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2013), a dataset compiled by Archibald and Feldman (2006) to compile tax and 
expenditure laws, and the National Center on Education Statistics Digest of Education 
Statistics to acquire data on enrollments in higher education, share of higher education 
enrollment in private institutions, and K-12 expenditures (U.S. Department of Education. 
Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, 2014).  The 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services provides Medicaid expenditures data 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2013) and The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
contains prison expenditures information (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013).  Higher 
education governance systems information is drawn from The Education Commission of 
the States and will represent whether a state has a coordinating agency, governing board, 
both a coordinating agency and governing board, or neither a coordinating agency nor 
governing board (Fulton, McGuinness, L’Orange, 2014).  Data on the political party of 
the governors is collected from the Governor’s Dataset from Klarner (2013).  
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Gubernatorial strength will be collected from The Institutional Power Ratings for the 50 
Governors of the United States, a dataset managed by Thad Beyle (2013).  Divided and 
unified government data is collected from the U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States (2012). 
State legislator policy preference data are not be derived from citizen ideology or 
interest group ratings, which has been the measurement in previous studies.  Rather, state 
legislator policy preferences are derived from data collected in a survey of state 
legislators.  Shor and McCarty (2011) have developed a continuous scale depicting state 
legislators’ policy preferences based off of responses to a survey and past state legislature 
voting which can be compared across states.  The survey, conducted by Project 
Votesmart National Political Awareness Test (NPAT), asks the same questions to 
incoming legislators in all states, allowing for a direct comparison of issue stances for 
legislators across states.  The responses of this survey are utilized to estimate the political 
viewpoints of states and state legislators. Data for this statistic are drawn from the State 
Legislative Aggregate Ideology Data, a data set compiled by Shor and McCarty, most 
recently updated in 2012.  This dataset contains state legislator policy preference data for 




A dynamic fixed-effect panel (DFEP) model estimated via a system GMM 
estimator will be the quantitative method for this study.  This method was selected for a 
variety of reasons.  First, this econometric technique will allow for an examination of 
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how prior year state appropriations to higher education influence current appropriation 
levels.  Second, DFEP models account for unobserved state-specific fixed-effects and 
time-related fixed-effects.   Third, this technique will account for possible endogeneity of 
one or more of the independent variables.  Overall, a DFEP model will allow for an 
interpretation of how current higher education appropriations are influenced by prior 
levels of appropriations and other past predictors of higher education appropriations.  
Because biased estimates may be found when utilizing DFEP models, the DFEP model 
combined with Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) techniques will be employed in 
this study to more accurately examine how lagged independent variables influence the 
dependent variable.   
 
Limitations 
       This study may be limited in a few ways.  First, in dynamic fixed-effects panel 
data analyses, causality cannot be determined; rather, it can only be inferred.  Second, 
though this study intends to include all the independent variables influencing state 
appropriations to higher education, there may be other possible variables, not included in 
the analysis, which may influence the dependent variable. Third, this study is limited in 
the number of years included for analysis.  Because one of the key independent variables, 
state legislator policy preferences, has only been consistently collected for each state 







       This study has possible implications for theory.  The spatial theory of voting has 
yet to be employed in the higher education finance literature.  Utilizing the spatial theory 
of voting in studies analyzing how policy preferences influence higher education policies 
adds to the growing body of higher education finance literature by offering an alternative 
theoretical framework to consider for future studies.  Additionally, previous literature has 
examined the influence of higher education interest groups on state appropriations to 
higher education (e.g., Tandberg, 2008).  However, this study utilizes the spatial theory 
of voting to examine whether the interaction of policy preferences and higher education 
interest groups influences state appropriations to higher education.   
This study has potential implications for research.  The statistical method utilized 
in this study, dynamic fixed effects panel modeling with Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) techniques, has only been employed once before in higher education 
research (Titus, 2009).  However, this method has never been utilized in studies 
examining state funding for higher education.  This method is most appropriate to utilize 
to quantitatively analyze panel data which includes a lag of the dependent variable as an 
independent variable.  In addition, this study shows the effectiveness of utilizing newly 
developed measures of policy preference data to understand that influence of state 
legislator preferences on higher education funding.   
       This study also has possible implications for policy.  A better understanding of 
how a number of variables, including political variables, influence state appropriations to 
higher education can help policymakers and administrators predict future appropriation 
levels. Moreover, examining how differing policy preferences, and the influence of 
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policy preferences interacting with higher education interest groups, affect higher 
education funding can help institutional leaders and policymakers forecast future funding 






























This study intends to examine the influence of state legislator policy preferences, 
higher education interest groups, and other variables on state funding to higher education. 
The theoretical framework guiding this study is the spatial theory of voting.  This chapter 
reviews and critiques the literature discussing state funding to higher education and the 
spatial theory of voting.   
        A number of prior studies (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Dar, 2012; Hossler, 
Lund, Ramin, Westfall, & Irish, 1997; McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009) have 
attempted to examine the influences of state higher education appropriations.  One set of 
studies (e.g., Clotfelter, 1976; Peterson, 1976) examined the influence of student 
enrollments on state appropriations to higher education.  A second set of studies, (e.g., 
Adams, 1977; Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011) assessing the influences of state 
appropriations to higher education, examined how state economic conditions affected 
higher education appropriations.  A third set of studies (e.g., Archibald and Feldman, 
2006; Dar, 2012) focused on higher education funding as part of a political process.  
These studies have utilized a variety of theoretical frameworks and conceptual models.   
Further, a few studies (e.g., Kane, Orszag, & Apostolov, 2005) have not utilized a 
theoretical framework when analyzing state appropriations to higher education.  The first 
part of this chapter will review the previous literature focusing on state funding to higher 
education and examine the theoretical frameworks in these studies.   
The second part of this chapter will review the spatial theory of voting and 
evaluate how this theory has been utilized in previous literature.  The second part of this 
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chapter will also discuss how the spatial theory of voting can guide studies examining the 
influence of legislator policy preferences on state funding of higher education.   
Given the purpose of this study, a discussion of the gaps in the literature will be 
presented in this chapter in order to portray the need for further research to address the 
following research questions: 
 
1. How do prior state appropriations to higher education, 
state characteristics, higher education governance systems, 
competing budget items, higher education interest groups, 
political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided 
legislature, and other unobservable variables influence state 
spending on higher education? 
 
2. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
governance systems, competing budget items, higher education 
interest groups, political party of the governors, gubernatorial 
strength, divided legislature, and other unobservable variables, 
how do policy preferences influence state spending on higher 
education? 
 
3. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
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governance systems, competing budget items, political party of 
the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and 
other unobservable variables, how do policy preferences 
varying with higher education interest groups influence state 




Previous Studies Examining State Financing of Higher Education 
 
 
Student Enrollment and State Appropriations 
 
A number of studies have been completed over the last forty years analyzing the 
influencers of state appropriations to higher education (e.g., Peterson, 1976; McLendon et 
al., 2009; Okunade, 2004).  One set of studies analyzing state appropriations to higher 
education focused on the association between higher education student enrollments and 
higher education appropriations.  One of the first studies on student enrollments and 
higher education funding was published in 1976 (Peterson, 1976).  In the study by 
Peterson (1976), the author analyzed how socioeconomic, environmental, and political 
variables influenced higher education appropriations.  The author hypothesized that 
certain environmental and political traits influenced state funding to higher education.  
Further, the author considered how environmental and political traits affected 
appropriation levels at two points in time: 1960 and 1969.  Within his analysis, Peterson 
(1976) was guided by the comparative policies theory.  The comparative policies theory 
assumes that certain variables influencing one policy may also influence another policy.  
In particular, Peterson (1976) hypothesized that certain socioeconomic and political 
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variables, shown to be influential in previous policy studies on K-12 education and 
welfare, would also be influential variables in the study of higher education 
appropriations.   
Within his study, Peterson (1976) included socioeconomic and environmental 
variables such as personal income per capita, corporate income per capita, percent of 
population college age, institutional enrollment, and the number of institutions within a 
state.  Political variables included gubernatorial power, legislative professionalism, civil 
rights support, and interparty competition.  The author employed correlation analysis and 
linear regression to examine how these socioeconomic, environmental, and political 
variables influenced higher education appropriations.  Peterson (1976) found that the 
socioeconomic, environmental, and political variables were statistically significant 
predictors of higher education appropriations.  Specifically, the author determined that 
states with higher levels of higher education funding were associated with a highly 
educated population.  Additionally, enrollment levels in public institutions were 
correlated with higher education appropriations; as enrollment levels increased, higher 
education appropriations increased.  In regards to the political variables, Peterson (1976) 
found that legislative professionalism was correlated with higher education appropriation 
levels in 1969, but not 1960.  Further, powerful governors were positively associated with 
larger appropriation levels to higher education in 1969 and increased interparty 
competition was positively associated with increased appropriations toward higher 
education in both 1960 and 1969.   
Overall, the comparative policies theory was useful in the selection of variables in 
the study by Peterson (1976) as many of the statistically significant variables found in 
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previous research showed similar statistical significance in his study. However, the 
political variables in the study by Peterson (1976) (e.g., legislative professionalism, 
interparty competition, and powers of the governor) did not fully capture all the potential 
political influencers affecting appropriations to higher education.  For example, the 
makeup of the political parties in the state legislature and the policy preferences of the 
legislators were not examined in this study.  Including additional political variables 
would have strengthened the study by Peterson (1976).  
A different study conducted by Clotfelter (1976) also sought to examine the 
predictors of higher education appropriations.  Similarly to Peterson (1976), the study by 
Clotfelter (1976) was one of the first research studies attempting to examine the 
influencers of higher education appropriations.  The author utilized an economic demand 
model developed from earlier studies seeking to determine expenditures for state budget 
items.  In particular, Clotfelter (1976) theorized that appropriations to higher education 
were determined by two factors: per-capita enrollment and state tax structures.  However, 
he measured per-capita enrollment differently than Peterson (1976).  Clotfelter (1976) 
defined per-capita enrollment as the number of college graduates in the state.  He 
hypothesized that as more college graduates migrated out of state and the enrollment of 
college graduates decreased, appropriations to higher education would decrease.  
Additionally, Clotfelter (1976) theorized that states with simpler tax structures were 
associated with lower levels of spending on budget items, including higher education.  
Given this model, the author examined state appropriations to higher education in 1970 
for all 50 US states.   
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Clotfelter (1976) utilized ordinary least squares regression to study the influence 
of enrollment and tax structures on higher education appropriations and had a number of 
conclusions.  First, he found that out-migration of college graduates in a state had a 
positive statistically significant relationship with higher education appropriations.   
Although enrollment was defined slightly differently than in the study by Peterson 
(1976), Clotfelter (1976) found that increased enrollment was associated with increased 
funding levels to higher education.  Second, the author determined that simpler tax 
structures were associated with lower appropriations to higher education.  Overall, the 
study by Clotfelter (1976), comparable to the study by Peterson (1976), was one of the 
first empirical studies assessing the predictors of higher education appropriations.  
However, Clotfelter (1976) only assessed one year of appropriation levels in his study 
and was therefore unable to determine higher education funding trends over time.  
Additionally, Clotfelter (1976) did not consider the effect of political influences on 
higher education appropriations.   In particular, political variables such as the political 
parties of the legislators and the governor might shape appropriation levels for all areas of 
the state budget, including higher education appropriations.  Thus, including political 
variables would have strengthened this study.  
Following the research of Clotfelter (1976) and Peterson (1976), researchers did 
not conduct analyses on the effect of student enrollment on higher education 
appropriations until many years later.  Strathman (1994) built upon the work developed 
by Clotfelter (1976) and Peterson (1976) and hypothesized that the amount of college 
graduates migrating out of a state would be associated with higher education funding 
levels.  The author utilized the benefit spillover hypothesis as the theoretical framework 
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within his study. The benefit spillover hypothesis asserts that public expenditures to 
higher education are negatively affected by the outmigration of college graduates from 
the state. The author employed a three-stage least squares model and determined that an 
increase in outmigration was associated with decreased spending levels on higher 
education.  Therefore, the results found by Strathman (1994) were comparable to the 
results of the study by Clotfelter (1976). 
Although Strathman (1994) had similar results to Clotfelter (1976), few variables 
were analyzed to determine the predictors of higher education funding.  Beyond assessing 
the influence of outmigration of college graduates on higher education appropriations, 
Strathman (1994) neglected to consider how other variables may affect appropriations.  
For example, political variables, demographic variables, state higher education 
governance structures, or state economic variables were excluded from the study.   
A different study (Leslie & Ramey, 1986) also analyzed the association between 
higher education student enrollments and state appropriations.  Leslie and Ramey (1986) 
utilized a framework that was based on a theory by Wildavsky (1964) regarding the 
politics of the budgetary process.  Wildavsky (1964) theorized that the largest factor 
determining the level of appropriations to different state agencies was the previous year’s 
appropriation.  Further, Wildavsky (1964) hypothesized that along with previous year’s 
appropriations, small increases in state budget categories could be expected each year.  
Leslie and Ramey (1986) utilized Wildavsky’s (1964) theory to study higher education 
appropriations; however, they posited that along with previous year’s appropriations, 
increases in enrollment levels would also be influential in influencing appropriations.  
Employing regression analysis, the authors found that increases in enrollment were 
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positively tied to appropriations levels; although, this was only the case in some US 
states.  They also found that in certain states, increases in appropriations were positively 
tied more heavily to economic conditions of the states rather than enrollment changes.  
Overall, Leslie and Ramey (1986) did find that enrollment changes positively influenced 
appropriation levels, but their findings were mixed depending on the region of the US.  
However, the authors neglected to include any variables taking into account possible 
political influences on higher education funding.  Considering the influence of political 
factors would have improved this study and may have helped explain the changes in 
appropriations to higher education across different regions of the US.   
In summary, the studies by Peterson (1976), Clotfelter (1976), Strathman (1994), 
and Leslie and Ramey (1986) all utilized regression techniques to test the relationship 
between enrollments and higher education appropriations.  The authors found mixed 
results and concluded that although enrollments, at times, positively influenced state 
appropriations to higher education, a host of other economic, demographic, and political 
variables were also influencing appropriation levels.  The theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks guiding these studies included the comparative policies theory, the benefit-
spillover hypothesis, and a conceptual framework based on the assumption that previous 
year’s appropriations predicted the following year’s appropriation levels.  As previously 
stated, many of these studies neglected to include political variables which may have 
influenced the higher education appropriations. Because state legislators are the political 
actors determining appropriations to state budget items, such as higher education, 
including political variables such as the strength and policy preferences of the legislators 
would enhance these studies.  Moreover, a framework more appropriately guiding the 
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selection of political variables may have led these authors to select political variables 
depicting the political influences of higher education appropriations.   
 
The Impact of Economic Conditions 
 
 Unlike studies assessing the influence of student enrollments on higher education 
appropriations, other studies have analyzed how states’ fiscal conditions, such as taxes 
and government spending, influence higher education appropriations (e.g., Adams, 1977; 
Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011).  One of the first studies exploring how a state’s fiscal 
condition affects higher education appropriations was conducted by Adams (1977).  The 
author hypothesized that because states are mandated to balance their budgets each year, 
weaker economic conditions force cuts in expenditures.  He hypothesized that during 
better economic conditions, states are able to increase expenditures.  Adams (1977) went 
on to explain that economic conditions can have a disproportionally negative impact on 
higher education during poor fiscal conditions.  The author explained that during weak 
economic times, the needs of social services, such as welfare, are prioritized in the state 
budget.  He claimed that higher education is disproportionally cut during these weaker 
economic times (Adams, 1977).  However, Adams (1977) did not empirically test this 
claim that higher education appropriations suffered disproportionally during weak 
economic times.   Although Adams (1977) neglected to test this hypothesis, later studies 
tested how weak economic conditions influenced higher education appropriations (e.g., 
Hovey, 1999; Delaney & Doyle, 2011).   
 The research by Adams (1977) was not advanced until an article written more 
than 20 years later.  In the article, Hovey (1999) also hypothesized that higher education 
appropriations were affected by states’ economic conditions.  Hovey (1999) agreed with 
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Adams (1977) that during poor economic times, higher education appropriations are 
disproportionally cut relative to other budget items.  However, Hovey (1999) postulated 
that during good economic times, higher education appropriations are actually funded at 
proportionally higher levels than other budget items.  Hovey (1999) labeled higher 
education appropriations as the ‘balance wheel’ in state budgets.  The, term ‘balance 
wheel’ reflected the nature of higher education funding: during poor economic times, 
state appropriations to higher education are cut disproportionally to other budget items, 
and during good economic times, state appropriations to higher education are increased at 
higher levels relative to other budget items.  Within the study, Hovey (1999) did not 
empirically test his claim of higher education being the balance wheel in state budgets; 
although, future work did empirically test this hypothesis (e.g., Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 
2011).  Overall, Hovey (1999) explained that state officials viewed higher education as 
more discretionary than other budget items, and as a result higher education funding has 
been, and will continue to be, heavily influenced by states’ fiscal conditions.  However, 
the author did not empirically test his claim, which was a major limitation of the study.  
 A few studies have utilized the balance wheel framework developed by Hovey 
(1999) to guide their studies (e.g. Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011).  In their first study 
utilizing the balance wheel framework, Delaney and Doyle (2007) utilized fixed-effects 
regression to examine how states’ economic conditions influenced higher education 
appropriations.  The authors studied eight years of data across all 50 US states and found 
that funding to higher education did in fact act as a balance wheel in state budgets.  
Specifically, Delaney and Doyle (2007) determined that during good economic 
conditions, higher education received greater appropriations relative to other budget 
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items.  Further, higher education received smaller appropriations relative to other budget 
items during poor economic conditions.  Overall, this study empirically portrayed how 
states’ economic conditions influenced higher education appropriations; however, the 
authors neglected to include the influence of political variables on higher education 
appropriations which were included in previous research (e.g., Peterson, 1976).  
Including variables such as political parties represented in the state legislature and state 
legislator policy preferences would have expanded this study.  In addition, although 
Delaney and Doyle (2007) utilized the balance-wheel framework developed by Hovey 
(1999), a different framework may have improved this study.  In particular, a framework 
from the field of political science, such as the median voter theorem or the spatial theory 
of voting, has been used to guide studies seeking to explain how political actors decide on 
policy outcomes, such as appropriation levels.  Therefore, employing a framework from 
the field of political science would have helped the authors select certain political 
variables that may influence higher education funding. 
 Delaney and Doyle (2011) conducted an updated study which utilized the balance 
wheel model to test how states’ economic conditions influenced higher education 
appropriations.  In their 2011 study, the authors utilized more years of data (1985-2004) 
and expanded the variables compared to their initial 2007 study.  Specifically, Delaney 
and Doyle (2011) included political variables such as the percentage of Republicans in 
the state legislature, voter participation in presidential elections, and the political party of 
the governor.  The authors compiled a panel dataset and used a first-differencing 
regression technique in their study.  They concluded that higher education appropriations 
followed the balance wheel model, similar to the result found in their 2007 study.  
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However, utilizing a first-differencing method, the authors examined how other variables 
influenced higher education appropriations.   Delaney and Doyle (2011) concluded that 
the political variables were not statistically significant predictors of higher education 
appropriations.  Other variables had mixed results; larger enrollments of students at 
private institutions resulted in lower appropriation levels while the percentage of the state 
population aged 18-24 was not statistically significant.  Further, the authors found that 
different types of higher education governing boards had no statistical significance on 
higher education appropriations.  
 Overall, the two studies by Delaney and Doyle (2007, 2011) empirically tested the 
influence of states’ economic conditions on higher education appropriations.  Both 
studies employed the balance wheel model as their framework.  Though this framework 
was appropriately used to examine the influence of states’ economic conditions on higher 
education appropriations, it is not the best framework to test how political variables 
influence higher education appropriations; a framework taking into account political 
influences on appropriations would be more appropriate in these studies.  Therefore, 
although Delaney and Doyle (2011) included a few political variables in their study, a 
framework guiding studies analyzing the influence of political variables would more 
aptly guide the selection of political variables in an assessment of higher education 
appropriations.   
Similarly to Delaney and Doyle (2007, 2011), Humphreys (2000), sought to 
assess the influence of states’ economic conditions on higher education appropriations.  
Humphreys (2000) hypothesized that cuts to higher education appropriations were a 
direct result of economic recessions.  Different than other authors (e.g., Delaney & 
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Doyle, 2007, 2011), Humphreys (2000) defined states’ economic conditions as state per 
capita income, a measure which captures changes across states and over time.  Utilizing 
25 years of data, the author used an econometric model in his analysis and showed that 
state per capita income levels had positive significant effects on higher education 
appropriations.  Further, Humphreys (2000) explained the discretionary nature of higher 
education appropriations, showing that during recessionary periods, higher education was 
more likely to be slashed from state budgets compared to other budget items.  For 
example, the author found that a 1.39% decrease in state higher education appropriations 
per student was associated with a 1% decrease in per capita income within a state 
(Humphreys, 2000).  Therefore, the author concluded that states’ economic conditions 
had direct influences on higher education appropriations. 
The study conducted by Humphreys (2000) depicted the influence of states’ 
economic conditions on higher education appropriations.  However, the author did not 
consider how other variables may impact higher education appropriations.  For example, 
the author neglected to include how other state demographic variables or political 
variables, which showed significance in previous higher education studies (e.g., Peterson, 
1976; Strathman, 1994), influenced higher education appropriations.   
In summary, a number of previous studies depicted the influence of states’ 
economic conditions on higher education appropriations.  Numerous authors (e.g. Adams, 
1977; Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011; Humphreys, 2000) analyzed the influence of a 
states’ economic condition on higher education and have found statistically significant 
results. However, incorporating demographic and political variables within these studies 
would help broaden the scope of variables.  Additionally, as previously outlined, a more 
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appropriate theoretical framework guiding studies assessing the influence of political 
variables on appropriations would have strengthened these studies. 
 
Competing Budget Items 
 
 A number of scholars have sought to understand how competing budget items 
have influenced state spending on higher education (e.g., Kane et al., 2005; Okunade, 
2004; Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998).  These studies have utilized different frameworks to 
guide the selection of variables and have found varying results, indicating that some 
competing state budget items do influence higher education appropriations while other 
budget items may not.  This next section will review the previous literature assessing the 
influence of competing budget items on higher education appropriations and discuss the 
theoretical frameworks guiding these studies.   
 One of the first studies examining whether competing budget items influenced 
higher education appropriations was conducted by Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998).  In 
this study, the authors examined the influence of economic and demographic variables on 
higher education appropriations.  Additionally, the authors considered whether K-12 
funding influenced higher education funding.  To guide their selection of variables, the 
authors utilized a theory from the field of political science: the median voter theory.  This 
theory asserts that the policy preferences of the median voter will drive legislator 
decision making. Utilizing this theory, the authors employed fixed-effects regression 
analysis.  They concluded that K-12 funding, at times, competed with higher education 
funding and drove funding from higher education toward K-12 appropriations.  Further, 
the authors determined that a host of economic variables were significant predictors of 
higher education funding.  Specifically, economic variables such as a healthier state 
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economy, as measured by unemployment rates and per capita income, were positively 
associated with higher education appropriations.   
 As previously stated, Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) utilized a theoretical 
framework from the field of political science to guide their study.  However, the authors 
neglected to examine how certain political variables influence higher education 
appropriations.  Including political variables such as the strength of the political parties in 
the state legislature or policy preferences would have strengthened the study.   Therefore, 
though a framework from political science was used in the study by Toutkoushian & 
Hollis (1998), the authors excluded certain political variables which may have influenced 
their results.   
A different study conducted by Okunade (2004) sought to examine whether 
higher education appropriations have competed with other state budget items such as 
Medicaid and prison expenditures in recent years.  The author hypothesized that states 
have been moving funding previously allocated for higher education and K-12 education 
to state Medicaid funds in recent years.  Moreover, Okunade (2004) portrayed how 
increases in the eligible population for Medicaid services, recent court mandates, and 
federal policy decisions have contributed to massive increases in Medicaid 
appropriations.  He also hypothesized that increased public demand for criminal 
sentencing and crime prevention augmented appropriations to prisons, which have 
crowded out higher education appropriations.  Given these assumptions, the framework 
guiding this study was based on the notion that higher education funding was competing 
with other state budget items, including Medicaid and prisons.  Testing these claims, 
Okunade (2004) utilized ordinary least squares regression and generalized least squares 
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regression and found that Medicaid spending had indeed crowded out higher education 
funding, which was comparable to prior findings (Breneman & Finney, 1997; Zumeta, 
2004).  However, Okunade (2004) showed a complementary relationship between prison 
appropriations and higher education appropriations.  Recent increases in prison spending 
correlated with increased appropriations to higher education; however, the relative 
amount of appropriations relegated to prisons and higher education was dwarfed by the 
recent surge in Medicaid spending.  Therefore, Okunade (2004) showed how Medicaid, a 
competing budget item, crowded out higher education appropriations while prison 
funding showed a complementary relationship with higher education funding.   
The analysis and accompanying results found by Okunade (2004) supported other 
research portraying how competing budget items crowded out spending on higher 
education (e.g., Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998).  However, the study by Okunade (2004) 
advanced previous research by incorporating political variables in the analysis.  
Specifically, the author examined whether the number of years to the next gubernatorial 
election influenced higher education appropriations.  Second, the author tested how 
higher education appropriations altered when the political party of the governor was the 
same as the party in control of the state legislature.  In regards to the first political 
variable, Okunade (2004) determined that the amount of time to the next gubernatorial 
election was not associated with higher education appropriations.  However, other 
political variables such as the party of the governor and the party in control of the state 
legislature did have statistically significant results.  In particular, Okunade (2004) found 
that Democratic governors that were in office during a Democratic party-controlled state 
legislature positively influenced spending on higher education.  
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In summary, the study by Okunade (2004) confirmed other research portraying 
the influence of competing budget items.  The author also examined how certain political 
variables influenced higher education appropriations, finding that a Democratic governor 
alongside a Democratic party-controlled legislature was positively associated with higher 
levels of appropriations to higher education.   Because the study by Okunade (2004) 
focused on the influence of political variables on state higher education appropriations, a 
theoretical framework from the field of political science would have been more 
appropriate for this study.   For example, the median voter theory, utilized by 
Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998), appropriately guides studies concentrating on the 
influence of political variables on policy outcomes.  Thus, the median voter theory, or 
another theory from political science which adequately guides the selection of political 
variables, would have strengthened this study.  
In a different study, Kane et al. (2005) examined how one large state budget 
appropriation, Medicaid, competed with higher education funding.  The authors did not 
utilize a theoretical framework, but hypothesized that Medicaid, which has demanded 
increased appropriations from state governments, crowded out spending to higher 
education.  Kane et al. (2005) found conclusive evidence that increases in Medicaid 
appropriations negatively impacted higher education appropriations.  For example, 
through the use of a fixed-effects regression model, the authors showed that for every 
new dollar spent on Medicaid, there was a reduction of six to seven cents in higher 
education funding.  Analyzing a ten year period in the late 1980’s to the late 1990’s, 
Kane et al. (2005) concluded that the expansion of Medicaid contributed to 
approximately 80% of the decline in state support for higher education. Therefore, the 
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authors determined that increased Medicaid appropriations acted as a competing budget 
item, which crowded out spending on higher education. 
Although the study by Kane et al. (2005) found evidence pointing to Medicaid 
funding crowding out higher education appropriations, the authors neglected to include a 
host of other variables that were found to be statistically significant in previous studies.  
For example, the authors did not include certain state characteristics, such as state 
enrollment in higher education, which were significant in previous research (e.g., 
Okunade, 2004).  Additionally, Kane et al. (2005) did not consider the influence of 
political variables on higher education appropriations. State legislators are the actors 
deciding upon the specific appropriation levels for higher education; therefore, including 
variables reflecting the state legislators’ policy preferences on higher education funding 
would have improved this study.  In summary, the study by Kane et al. (2005) provided a 
robust analysis of how one competing state budget item, Medicaid, influenced higher 
education funding; however, the authors neglected to include other demographic, 
economic, and political variables.  
 In summary, authors (e.g., Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998; Kane et al., 2005; 
Okunade, 2004) exploring the influence of competing budget items on higher education 
funding found mixed results.  Specifically, Medicaid funding, prison expenditures and K-
12 funding were found to have a negative or complementary influence on higher 
education appropriations.  Though these variables were statistically significant, future 
studies should also examine how political variables influence higher education 
appropriations.  In particular, because state legislators decide upon appropriation levels 
for higher education, variables reflecting the policy preferences and philosophy of state 
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legislators would help predict higher education funding levels. Therefore, including 
variables reflecting legislator viewpoints would improve future studies.  
 
 
Mix of Demographic, Economic, and Political Influences 
 
 Many recent studies analyzing higher education funding have assessed the 
influence of either demographic variables, economic variables, or political variables on 
state appropriations to higher education.  The next section of this chapter will review 
studies analyzing all three of these variables on higher education appropriations. 
 Hossler, Lund, Ramin, Westfall, and Irish (1997) conducted a study assessing the 
impact of economic, demographic, and political influences on state funding for higher 
education.  The authors utilized a framework drawn from three bodies of literature: 
studies exploring the impact of student financial assistance on higher education funding; 
studies examining the privatization of higher education; and studies assessing the 
influence of economic, demographic, governance, and political factors on higher 
education funding.  Hossler et al. (1997) used all 50 US states over three years (1990-
1992) and employed regression analysis, exploratory factor analysis, and interviews to 
examine how states’ economic, demographic, and political characteristics influenced 
higher education spending.  The authors found that enrollment levels and previous year’s 
appropriations to higher education positively influenced higher education appropriations.   
Additionally, the authors did not find that competing budget items such as Medicare and 
K-12 education influenced state support for higher education, which contrasts the results 
found in other research (e.g., Kane et al., 2005; Okunade, 2004). 
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 The study by Hossler et al. (1997) was one of the first studies which attempted to 
examine how economic, demographic, and political variables influenced of higher 
education funding.  Although their framework included literature drawn from a variety of 
previous higher education studies, the authors did not adequately include all the relevant 
demographic and political variables.  Inclusion of variables such as the political party of 
the governor, the strength of the political party of the legislature, and enrollment in higher 
education institutions would have improved this study.  In addition, state legislators are 
directly involved in shaping the amount of appropriations to higher education each year.  
Therefore, inclusion state legislator viewpoints on education expenditures may help 
explain the influences of higher education appropriations across states.  
 In another study, Weerts (2002) sought to understand which variables influenced 
state appropriations to public research universities.  The author included a mix of 
demographic, economic, and political variables in the study, including higher education 
governance structure, state tax rates, institutional enrollments, and political climate.  
Weerts (2002) employed a complex theoretical framework to guide his study.  
Specifically, Weerts (2002) utilized three organizational theories; rational perspectives, 
political perspectives, and cultural perspectives to guide his study.  These theories were 
chosen because Weerts (2002) claimed that organizational theories best guide studies 
seeking to explain how government bodies, such as state legislatures, appropriate funding 
to higher education.   The author employed multiple regression analysis to investigate 
how demographic, economic, political, and institutional characteristics predicted state 
appropriations to public research universities over six years in the 1990’s.  He found that 
a state’s higher education governance structure, political climate, institutional enrollment 
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and expenditures, and a state’s tax rate all helped predict state support for public research 
universities.  Specifically, the author found that consolidated governing boards were 
associated with higher funding levels.  In regards to the political climate predicting state 
appropriations, Weerts (2002) determined that in states in which Democrats controlled 
both chambers in the state legislature, appropriations to higher education were 
significantly higher compared to states in which Republicans controlled both chambers.  
Additionally, Weerts (2002) found that states with higher per capita taxes were associated 
with increased appropriation levels. In summary, Weerts (2002) concluded that a number 
of economic, demographic, political, and institutional characteristics helped to predict 
state funding to public research universities in the 1990’s.  
 In a different study conducted by Weerts and Ronca (2006), the authors attempted 
to analyze the differences in state support for higher education in the 1990’s across US 
states.  Their conceptual model was compiled from a few areas of previous literature: 
First, Weerts and Ronca (2006) included previous literature analyzing the significance of 
economic and demographic variables on higher education appropriations.  Second, the 
authors hypothesized that certain political factors, such as the political party of the 
governor, might impact higher education appropriations.  In particular, they theorized that 
Democratic governors would positively influence higher education appropriations.  
Third, the authors portrayed how higher education governance structures impacted state 
funding for higher education.  Specifically, they hypothesized that states with higher 
education coordinating boards may positively influence higher education appropriations 
more than states with higher education governing boards.  Fourth, Weerts and Ronca 
(2006) argued that state culture, such as state history and tradition may impact higher 
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education funding.  The authors hypothesized that states that historically funded higher 
education at high levels would continue to do so.  Fifth, the authors hypothesized that 
institutional factors such as increased enrollment, increased grants and contracts, and 
increased private gifts and grants would positively influence state support for higher 
education.   
 Weerts and Ronca (2006) utilized a mixed methods approach in their study.  Their 
qualitative section included document reviews and a series of interviews with campus and 
state higher education professionals.  The authors utilized multivariate regression for the 
quantitative section of their study.  Overall, Weerts and Ronca (2006) determined that a 
number of variables influenced higher education funding.  Dissimilar to other research 
(e.g., Kane et al., 2005), the authors found that increases in K-12 and healthcare funding 
was positively correlated to higher education funding.  Additionally, the authors found 
that state legislatures controlled by Republicans were associated with lower funding 
levels for higher education compared to state legislatures controlled by Democrats.  In 
addition, Weerts and Ronca (2006) found that higher levels of private gifts and increased 
enrollments at institutions were associated with higher levels of state support for research 
universities.  Overall, the authors found mixed results, compared to earlier studies (e.g., 
Kane et al., 2005; Okunade, 2004).  In addition, although the authors reviewed some 
relevant literature related to the influence of political variables on higher education 
appropriations, a framework grounded within political science would have more 
appropriately guided their study.  In particular, given the authors’ focus on political 
influences on higher education appropriations, a framework guiding the selection of 
political variables would have strengthened the study.   
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 Weerts and Ronca (2008) conducted a similar study a few years after their 2006 
study to examine state appropriations to higher education.  In the 2008 study, they 
employed a different theoretical framework.  Specifically, the authors utilized 
organizational theory to guide their study.  Weerts and Ronca (2008) hypothesized that 
organizational theory was the most appropriate framework to guide their study because 
organizational theory best guides studies analyzing how state and institutional factors 
influence decisions made by state governmental bodies.  The authors employed a 
random-effects regression model to examine how state appropriations to higher education 
changed over 20 years (1985 to 2004).  First, they found that state appropriations to 
higher education were lower in states with higher per capita income levels.  Second, they 
concluded that in states with higher percentage of citizens aged 18-24, higher education 
appropriations were lower.  Third, Weerts and Ronca (2008) found that Republican 
governors were associated with higher levels of funding for higher education.  Fourth, the 
authors determined that increases in health care, corrections, and K-12 expenditures 
resulted in decreased funding for higher education.  Fifth, the authors concluded that 
previous levels of appropriations helped predict future levels of funding for higher 
education.  Overall, Weerts and Ronca (2008) found that a variety of economic, 
demographic, and political variables influenced higher education appropriations.  
However, similar to their 2006 study, Weerts and Ronca (2008) utilized organizational 
theory to guide their study.  Because the authors considered how political variables, such 
as political parties, influenced higher education appropriations, a different theoretical 
framework would have improved their study.  Particularly, a framework guiding the 
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selection of political variables would have been more appropriate in the study by Weerts 
and Ronca (2008).  
 A more recent study by McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher (2009) analyzed how a 
mix of economic, demographic, and political variables influenced state support for higher 
education.  The authors developed a conceptual framework drawn from three strands of 
literature:  First, the authors looked at past studies analyzing postsecondary finance.  
Second, the authors looked at previous literature studying higher education governance.  
Third, McLendon et al. (2009) analyzed previous studies concentrating on comparative 
state politics.  From these groups of studies, the authors examined how state support for 
higher education was influenced by political parties of the governor and legislature, 
legislative professionalism, citizen ideology, interest group climates, and the economic 
and demographic conditions of the states.  Specific political variables included the 
percentage of Republican legislators in the state legislature, the political party of the 
governor, legislator term limits, tax and expenditure limitation policies, gubernatorial 
power, and the number of higher education interest groups in a state.  Another political 
variable, citizen ideology, was included in the study.  Citizen ideology, a measure created 
by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998) is an index measuring the policy 
preferences of the state’s electorate based off of roll call voting scores of members of the 
US Congress.   
 Compiling a pooled cross-sectional time-series dataset and using fixed-effects 
regression, McLendon et al. (2009) found that a host of economic, demographic, and 
enrollment variables influenced higher education appropriations.  For example, lower 
state unemployment rates were associated with increased funding levels for higher 
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education.  In addition, higher funding levels were positively associated with greater 
enrollments.  In regards to the political variables, McLendon et al. (2009) found varying 
results. First, higher levels of legislative professionalism, defined as a legislator’s pay, 
days in session, and the number staff members per legislator, was found to be statistically 
significant.  Specifically, higher levels of legislative professionalism were associated with 
higher postsecondary funding levels.  Second, a Republican governor was associated with 
lower levels of higher education funding.  Third, a strong Republican state legislature, as 
measured by the percent of Republicans in the legislature, was associated with lower 
levels of higher education spending.  Fourth, states with legislator term limits were 
associated with higher levels of funding for higher education.  Fifth, as the amount of 
higher education interest groups increased, so did state funding for higher education.  
Sixth, strong governors were associated with lower levels of funding toward higher 
education.   
The study by McLendon et al. (2009) advanced previous literature analyzing state 
funding for higher education by including variables found to be significant in previous 
work and employing a robust statistical technique.  However, one of the key political 
variables in the study, citizen ideology, had limitations.  This variable, which was 
developed by Berry et al. (1998), measured the policy preferences of members of the U.S. 
Congress.  In the study by Berry et al. (1998), it was assumed that the policy preferences 
of the state’s Congressional delegation were the same as the state’s legislative body.  
However, state legislators, not state representatives in Congress, make decisions on 
higher education appropriations.  In the study by McLendon et al. (2009), the authors 
utilized this variable as a proxy for state legislator policy preferences.  A more accurate 
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measure of the policy preferences of state legislators would have improved this study by 
McLendon et al. (2009).   
 In a different study conducted by Rizzo (2006), the author examined how a 
number of different variables, including demographic, economic, political, and 
institutional specific variables influenced state support for higher education.  The author 
did not utilize a conceptual model or a theoretical framework in his study.  Regardless, he 
assembled data from 1977 through 2001 in order to compare how variables influenced 
higher education funding at two different points in time.  Demographic and economic 
variables included the percent of the states’ population in certain age ranges, state income 
levels, the state unemployment rate, K-12 enrollment, higher education enrollments in 
private vs. public institutions, migration of students in and out of state, and state tax 
revenues.  Political variables included the political party of the governor, voter 
participation rates, divided or unified state legislature, and the amount of state assembly 
seats.  Institutional specific variables included enrollments, private giving, and degree 
production.  Rizzo (2006) used ordinary least squares regression, the Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel estimation technique, and augmented regressions to examine how these 
aforementioned variables influenced state higher education funding.   
 Rizzo (2006) determined that a variety of variables influenced higher education 
funding.  In particular, Rizzo (2006) found that vast decreases in state support for higher 
education from 1977 to 2001 were influenced by increases in income inequality.  
Additionally, the author determined that court mandates had increased appropriations to 
K-12 education which diminished higher education appropriations.  In regards to political 
and institutional variables, Rizzo (2006) had a number of findings:  First, as state 
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legislatures increased in size, higher education funding decreased.  Second, higher 
education funding increased when larger shares of doctoral degrees were awarded in 
science and technology fields.  Third, states with larger shares of students in two- year 
colleges saw higher appropriations toward higher education.  Fourth, as private donations 
to institutions increased, state support dwindled.  Fifth, states with a unified legislature 
(both chambers of the state legislator with the same political party in control), were 
associated with lower funding to higher education.  In summary, Rizzo (2006) concluded 
that a variety of demographic, economic, political and institutional specific variables 
influenced higher education appropriations.  However, the lack of a theoretical 
framework or conceptual model in the study was a major limitation.   
In summary, studies analyzing how economic, demographic, and political 
characteristics influence higher education have advanced the literature on state higher 
education finance (e.g., McLendon et al., 2009; Rizzo, 2006).  However, a number of 
limitations exist within these studies.  First, some of the aforementioned studies (e.g., 
McLendon et. al, 2009; Weerts & Ronca, 2006, 2008) neglected to examine how 
competing budget items, found to be statistically significant in previous research (e.g., 
Kane et. al, 2005), influenced higher education funding.  Second, there were limitations 
in how the authors defined political variables.  For example, state legislator policy 
preference variables could be improved to more accurately depict state legislator policy 
preferences.  Third, because these studies were attempting to explain the influence of 
political variables on higher education funding, a theoretical framework guiding the 
selection of political variables would have been more appropriate.  Frameworks from the 
field of political science, such as the median voter theory, or the special theory of voting, 
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appropriately guide studies seeking to explain how political variables influence 
government spending.  
 
Studies Focusing on Political Variables 
A few recent studies have concentrated on the influence of political variables on 
higher education appropriations.  Though some of these studies also consider other 
variables, such as economic and demographic characteristics, the focus is on political 
variables.  This next section will review and critique these studies.  
Archibald and Feldman (2006) examined how political variables, including state 
citizen policy preferences and political party affiliation of the governor and state 
legislature, influenced higher education appropriations; however, the authors did not 
employ a theoretical framework or conceptual model within their study.  State citizen 
policy preferences was based on measures developed by Berry et al. (1998) and was 
defined as the philosophical preferences and political orientations of the state citizenry.  
Archibald and Feldman (2006) utilized this measure in their study and found that state 
citizen policy preferences were statistically significant.  Specifically, more liberal states 
were associated with higher levels of spending on higher education.  Further, in 
examining how the political party influenced higher education funding, the authors had a 
variety of results.  First, they determined that states with a Democratic governor prior to 
1980 were associated with lower levels of appropriations to higher education.  After 
1980, states with Democratic governors were associated with higher spending levels for 
higher education.  The same conclusion was found for the state legislature: a Democratic 
controlled legislature prior to 1980 was associated with lower funding levels to higher 
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education while a Democratic controlled legislature after 1980 was associated with 
higher levels of funding to higher education (Archibald & Feldman, 2006).  
The study by Archibald and Feldman (2006) was one of the first higher education 
studies concentrating on the influence of policy preferences on higher education 
appropriations.  As explained earlier, the authors utilized state citizen ideology as a proxy 
for the state elected officials’ policy preferences and political orientations.  This variable 
measured the policy preferences of members of the U.S. Congress, assuming that the 
policy preferences of the state’s congressional delegation were the same as the state 
citizenry.  Assuming a state’s congressional delegation has the same policy preferences 
as the state citizenry is one limitation of this study. Policy preferences are built from 
individual beliefs, opinions, and preferences; therefore, one cannot assume that the state 
citizenry policy preferences directly align with the Congressional delegation in that state.  
Therefore, although Archibald and Feldman (2006) utilized a measure for policy 
preferences, a more accurate measure of policy preferences based on the policy 
preference of the state citizens or state legislators would have strengthened their study. 
Archibald and Feldman (2006) also examined whether state tax and expenditure 
limitation laws (TELs) influenced state funding to higher education.  TELs were defined 
as state policy which restricts the growth of state expenditures, relative to the growth of 
state personal income.  The authors found that states with broad based TELs were 
associated with lower levels of spending on higher education.  Therefore, TELS, 
introduced by many states in the 1980’s, did negatively influence state appropriations to 
higher education.  
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The study by Archibald and Feldman (2006) helped advance the higher education 
finance literature, especially the literature pertaining to the political factors influencing 
higher education appropriations.  However, the authors did not utilize a theoretical 
framework or conceptual model in their study.  Further, a more accurate measure of 
policy preferences could have been used to examine the effect of state legislators’ policy 
preference on higher education appropriations.  
A different study by Dar (2011) analyzed how states’ political landscapes, as 
defined by the influence of state political parties, affected higher education 
appropriations.  The author utilized a theoretical framework from political science to 
study how political variables influenced higher education funding in California.  
Specifically, Dar (2011) employed the median voter theory in her study.  The median 
voter theory, which was also used in the study by Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998), states 
that the views and opinions of the median voter will be reflected by the legislators.  
However, different from the research by Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998), the study by 
Dar (2011) included variables such as political polarization and party strength.  Dar 
(2011) hypothesized that politically liberal legislatures would be associated with higher 
levels of spending toward higher education while politically conservative legislatures 
would be associated with lower levels of spending for higher education.  To examine 
liberalism and conservatism within the legislatures, Dar (2011) used a variable termed 
“Democratic Strength”.  Democratic strength was defined as the percentage of seats held 
by Democrats in the two state legislative chambers.  Dar (2011) also sought to examine 
how political polarization affected higher education funding.  To measure polarization, 
the author calculated the average distance between DW-NOMINATE scores of 
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Democrats and Republicans of the state’s congressional delegation. DW-NOMINATE 
scores, developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1983), are measures of policy preference for 
members of the US Congress.  In her study, Dar (2011) utilized DW-NOMINATE scores 
as a proxy of state legislator policy preferences.  In summary, levels of 
liberalism/conservatism and political polarization were the two main components of 
Dar’s (2011) theoretical framework.    
Dar (2011) utilized data from 1976 to 2006 and employed regression analysis to 
examine trends in state funding to higher education in California.  The author determined 
that as the percentage of Democrats in the legislature increased, funding for higher 
education decreased.  This finding was in contrast to her hypothesis that more liberal 
legislatures, as defined by a Democratic controlled legislature, would be associated with 
higher levels of funding for higher education.  Dar (2011) also found that as legislatures 
became more polarized, higher education funding decreased.  However, one limitation of 
this approach is that it is not comparable across states.  A Democratic controlled 
legislature in another part of the country may or may not behave similarly to the 
Democratic controlled legislature in California.  Neglecting to note this restriction is a 
limitation within this study.   
Overall, the study by Dar (2011) was similar to previous literature which 
examined the effects of the makeup and control of political parties in state legislatures on 
higher education appropriations (e.g., Hossler et al, 1997; Weerts, 2002; Weerts & 
Ronca, 2006, 2008; McLendon et al., 2009).  In addition, Dar (2011) examined how 
policy preferences influenced higher education appropriations.  Few studies in higher 
education (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2006; McLendon et al., 2009) have utilized policy 
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preferences as a variable when examining state appropriations to higher education.  
Moreover, similar to previous studies, the study by Dar (2011) utilized variables for 
policy preferences that were based on U.S. Congressional viewpoints and were not direct 
measures of state legislator policy preferences.  Therefore, a more direct measure of state 
legislator policy preferences would have strengthened this study.  Further, Dar (2011) did 
not include certain variables in her study that were found to be significant in previous 
research, including state economic and demographic variables.  
In a different study by Dar and Spence (2011), the authors hypothesized that 
higher education funding was influenced by the levels of political polarization in the state 
legislatures and states’ economic conditions.  The authors did not utilize a specific 
theoretical framework or conceptual model.  They collected data from 49 states from 
1976 to 2004 and employed a fixed- effects regression model to test their hypothesis.  
Dar and Spence (2011) found preliminary evidence to support the notion that during 
lower levels of polarization, Democrats were associated with slightly higher levels of 
appropriations.  During high levels of polarization, Democrats were still associated with 
higher levels of appropriations, though it was not as significant as compared with lower 
levels of polarization (Dar & Spence, 2011).  This study, along with the study by Dar 
(2011) was one of the first attempts to examine the influences of political polarization on 
higher education funding.  However, as mentioned earlier, no clear theoretical framework 
or conceptual model was used in this study.  
A few other recent studies sought to understand the influence of politics on higher 
education funding within the states.  In one such study, David Tandberg (2008) examined 
the influence of interest groups on higher education appropriations.  The author 
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developed a conceptual framework which took into account socioeconomic factors, 
demographic factors, and states’ political systems.  Some of the political variables 
analyzed in his study included the party of the governor, party of the legislature, 
legislative professionalism, political culture, electoral competition, public policy 
preferences, unification of the legislature, and voter turnout.  Tandberg (2008) also 
sought to examine whether interest groups, such as higher education interest groups, 
influenced higher education funding.  Tandberg (2008) pointed out that previous research 
proved that the number and type of interest groups influenced policy outcomes (e.g., 
Jacoby & Schneider, 2001) and sought to test this in the higher education literature.  
Therefore, Tandberg (2008) explored how the number of higher education interest 
groups, within a state, influenced state appropriations to higher education.    
Utilizing cross-section time-series data, Tandberg (2008) employed a regression 
model to examine influence of politics on higher education funding.  Tandberg (2008) 
found that many of the political variables in his study influenced state higher education 
funding appropriations.  Notably, a Democrat governor or Democratic controlled 
legislature resulted in higher levels of appropriations for higher education.  In addition, 
unified legislatures (legislatures with the same political party controlling both the House 
and Senate) were associated with lower funding levels for higher education, which was 
similar to a finding by Rizzo (2006).  Higher education interest groups also showed 
significant results in the study: more powerful higher education interest groups within a 
state were associated with higher levels of funding for higher education.  Specifically, 
Tandberg (2008) discovered that the greater number of higher education interests groups, 
relative to the number of other interest groups within the state, positively influenced state 
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appropriations to higher education.  Therefore, Tandberg (2008) proved that the number 
of interest groups lobbying on behalf of higher education influenced funding outcomes.  
Overall, this study by Tandberg (2008) included a new aspect of political influences on 
higher education appropriations, higher education interest groups, which had not been 
included in previous literature.   
In a more recent study by Tandberg (2010), the author attempted to improve his 
2008 study by developing an original theoretical and conceptual framework to study the 
influence of politics on higher education appropriations.  Tandberg (2010) labeled his 
new framework the fiscal policy framework.  The fiscal policy framework was developed 
from the institutional rational choice framework and the policy framework.  Specifically, 
the fiscal policy framework “assumes that the actions of political decision makers are a 
function of the attributes of the individuals (e.g., values and resources) and the attributes 
of the decision situation, and that within those constraints actors are weighing expected 
benefits and costs of their possible actions prior to making a decision” (Tandberg, 2010, 
p. 740).  Utilizing this framework, Tandberg (2010) considered the influence of the 
number of state higher education interest groups, political attributes, governmental 
institutions, state higher education factors, previous year’s appropriations, economic 
variables, demographic variables, and political culture variables on appropriation levels.  
Similar to his previous study, Tandberg (2010) included a multitude of variables to 
analyze higher education appropriations over a 30 year period.  He employed stepwise 
regression and had a number of significant findings.  First, he found that the previous 
year’s higher education appropriation level was a strong predictor of the following year’s 
appropriation levels.  Second, Tandberg (2010) found that some of his political variables 
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were statistically significant.  In particular, he concluded that states with a larger number 
of higher education interest groups, relative to the number of other interest groups in the 
state, were associated with larger higher education appropriations. This finding was 
consistent to the finding in his 2008 study that higher education interest groups 
influenced funding outcomes.  In addition, increases in legislator salaries were associated 
with higher levels of funding for higher education.  Tandberg (2010) found that uniparty 
state legislatures were associated with lower levels of funding for higher education.  One 
of the key political variables, citizen ideology, was measured based on the policy 
preferences of members of Congress each year.  Similarly to previous studies (e.g., 
Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Dar, 2012; McLendon et al., 2009), the political variable, 
citizen ideology, did not accurately depict the policy preferences of state legislators.  A 
variable depicting the policy preferences of state legislators would be more appropriate 
because state legislators have direct influence over state higher education appropriations. 
Regardless, Tandberg (2010) found that citizen ideology was positively associated with 
higher education funding: more liberal policy preferences were associated with an 
increase in higher education appropriations. Overall, Tandberg (2010) had a number of 
significant findings in his 2010 study; however, improving the policy preference variable 
to more accurately depict the preferences of the state’s legislators would have enhanced 
this study.  
In a different study, Tandberg and Ness (2011) sought to understand the political 
influences on state capital expenditures to higher education.  Previous studies examined 
how different variables influenced general funding for higher education.  However, this 
study sought to understand if these variables also influenced capital expenditures.  The 
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authors considered a set of hypotheses considering how demographic, economic, and 
political factors predicted levels of capital funding for higher education.  Tandberg and 
Ness (2011) utilized a variable, citizen ideology, to measure the influence of policy 
preferences on higher education funding decisions.  Similar to previous research (e.g., 
Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Dar, 2012; Tandberg, 2010), citizen ideology did not 
appropriately capture the policy preferences of the state legislators.  Rather, it depicted 
the policy preferences of the US Congress, which is comprised of legislators who do not 
decide on state higher education appropriations.  Therefore, a more accurate measure of 
state legislator policy preferences would have improved the study. 
Utilizing fixed-effects regression, Tandberg and Ness (2011) found that many 
political variables found in previous studies were also statistically significant in their 
study.  First, the authors found that an increase in higher education interest groups, 
relative to other state interest groups, resulted in increased funding for capital 
expenditures.  In particular, the authors found that the higher education interest group 
variable showed greater statistical significance in predicting higher education funding 
compared to the other political variables in the study.  Second, political culture, as 
defined by the racial and ethnic diversity of states, proved to be statistically significant in 
that more diverse states were associated with higher education funding levels.   Third, as 
elections became more competitive, capital support for higher education also increased.  
Fourth, governors with budgetary power were associated with lower levels of higher 
education funding.   Overall, Tandberg and Ness (2011) portrayed that a variety of 
political variables influenced state capital support for higher education funding; though 
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the higher education interest group variable showed the greatest statistical significance in 
the study.   
In summary, the studies by Archibald and Feldman (2006), Dar (2011), Dar and 
Spence (2011), Tandberg (2008, 2010), and Tandberg and Ness (2011) focused on how 
certain political factors influenced appropriations to higher education.  Within many of 
these studies (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Dar, 2012; McLendon et al., 2009; 
Tandberg, 2010) the authors examined whether policy preferences influenced higher 
education funding.  The measure of policy preferences was based on either the 
preferences of the state citizenry or members of the US Congress and not based off of the 
policy preferences of state legislators.  State legislators are the political actors with direct 
influence over higher education funding.  Therefore, a variable which directly measures 
the policy preferences of state legislators would have strengthened these studies.   
A few of the aforementioned studies (e.g., Tandberg, 2010; Tandberg & Ness, 
2011) examining the influence of policy preferences on higher education funding also 
examined the influence of interest groups on higher education funding.  In particular, 
Tandberg (2010) and Tandberg and Ness (2011) examined how the influence of higher 
education interest groups, relative to all other interest groups in a state, influenced higher 
education appropriations.  The authors determined that an increase in the ratio of higher 
education interest groups compared to all interest groups within a state, positively 
influenced higher education funding.  Therefore, higher education interest groups, shown 
to be statistically significant in previous studies, should be included in future studies 




The Influence of Policy Preferences on Higher Education Funding 
 
Recent studies have shown that a host of political variables influence state 
funding to higher education, including; political party of the governor and legislators, 
legislative professionalism, higher education interest groups, gubernatorial power, 
divided vs. unified government, and percentage of seats in the legislature held by 
Republicans/Democrats (e.g., Dar, 2012; McLendon et al., 2009; Rizzo, 2006; Tandberg, 
2008, 2010).  An additional political variable, policy preferences, has also been analyzed 
in recent literature to assess its influence on higher education appropriations (e.g., 
Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Dar, 2012; McLendon et al., 2009; Tandberg & Ness, 
2011).  Scholars attempting to analyze the influence of policy preferences on higher 
education appropriations have encountered two main limitations.  First, the measure of 
policy preferences was based on the policy preferences of members of the US Congress, 
developed by Berry et al. (1998) or the policy preferences of the state’s citizens.  State 
legislator policy preferences, which have recently been measured by Shor and McCarty 
(2011), would be a more appropriate measure in studies assessing state funding to higher 
education because state legislators are the political actors deciding on higher education 
funding.   Second, previous studies have utilized a variety of theoretical frameworks and 
conceptual models to study the influence of political variables on higher education 
funding.  However, no studies have employed an appropriate theoretical framework from 
the field of political science to guide the selection of political variables.  This study 
intends to employ a newly developed measure of policy preferences, which is based on 
the policy preferences of state legislators, in order to assess the influence of policy 
preferences on higher education funding.  Additionally, this study intends to employ an 
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appropriate theoretical framework from the field of political science to guide the selection 
of political variables.  
 
A Framework to Guide this Study 
 
In previous studies assessing the influence of policy preferences on higher 
education appropriations, a few different frameworks were employed.   Dar (2011) used 
the median voter theory as her theoretical framework and McLendon et al. (2009) 
developed an original conceptual framework based on postsecondary finance literature, 
higher education governance literature, and comparative state politics literature.   
Archibald and Feldman (2006) did not have a clear conceptual model or theoretical 
framework and Tandberg (2010) developed a new framework called the fiscal policy 
framework to guide his study.  Additionally, Dar and Spence (2011) did not have a clear 
theoretical framework and Tandberg and Ness (2011) considered a set of hypotheses to 
test the influence demographic, economic, and political variables on higher education 
appropriations.  The aforementioned theories were used to guide studies seeking to assess 
the influence of policy preferences on policy outcomes.  However, when studying the 
influence of political variables on policy outcomes, a theory from the field of political 
science is most appropriate.  Only Dar (2011) and Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) 
utilized a framework from the field of political science, the median voter theory, to guide 
their studies.  This study proposes a different theory from the field of political science 
which is more appropriate in guiding studies analyzing the influence of policy 
preferences on higher education appropriations.  
The spatial theory of voting has been employed within the field of political 
science to guide studies analyzing legislative voting behavior.  Downs (1957) and Black 
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(1958) were two of the first scholars to write about the spatial theory of voting.  Since 
then, multiple scholars have utilized this theory in studies seeking to explain why 
legislators vote the way they do on specific policies (Enelow & Hinich, 1984).  Broadly 
speaking, the spatial theory of voting posits that legislators evaluate policy alternatives 
and make policy decisions based on their own preferences.  The theory does not explain 
the source of a legislator’s preference; rather, the spatial theory of voting assumes that 
legislators vote for policies that are most favorable to them.  In sum, this theory assumes 
that legislators act rationally by evaluating alternative policies and choose to vote based 
on their own interests (Enelow & Hinich, 1984).   
The spatial theory of voting has a number of characteristics:  First, as previously 
stated, legislators’ are assumed to vote on policies based on their own preferences.  This 
means that legislators’ philosophical principles drive their voting behavior.  Moreover, 
legislators do not vote based on the wishes of their political party, but rather act on their 
individual preferences when deciding on policy alternatives.  Legislator’s philosophical 
principles on any given issue may or may not align with what is specified within their 
party’s platform.  Overall, the spatial theory of voting assumes that legislator’s will cast 
votes on each policy based on their own preference (Enelow & Hinich, 1984).  
A second characteristic of the spatial theory of voting has to do with legislator 
policy preferences.  It is assumed in the spatial theory of voting that legislators have 
individual preferences on policy alternatives (Krehbiel, 1988).  For example, take a group 
of five legislators voting on funding for higher education.  Legislator 1 prefers that higher 
education funding should be $50 million dollars, legislator 2 prefers funding for higher 
education at $60 million, legislator 3 at $75 million, legislator 4 at $25 million, and 
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legislator 5 at $30 million.  These policy preferences can be plotted on a preference curve 
for each legislator.  Figure 2.1 depicts Legislator 1’s preference curve.  As Figure 1 
shows, Legislator 1’s preference is at $50 million dollars, which is represented as his 
ideal point on the graph at $50 million.  Legislator 1’s policy alternatives are symmetrical 
around $50 million.  This means that the farther away an alternative policy is from 
Legislator 1’s preference, the less preferred it is.  If two alternatives are the same distance 
from Legislator 1’s ideal point, he is indifferent to the alternatives.  Thus, Legislator 1 is 
indifferent to $40 million or $60 million in funding as they are both $10 million away 
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Preference curves can be plotted for any legislator in this example.  Each 
preference curve would show a single peaked policy preference, depicted as an ideal 
point, for each legislator.  Moreover, similar to Legislator 1’s preference curve, policy 
alternatives would be less preferred the farther away the alternative lies from the 
legislator’s ideal point.  In summary, the spatial theory of voting assumes legislator 
policy preferences are single peaked and policy alternatives are less preferred the farther 
away the alternative is from the each legislator’s ideal point (Krehbiel, 1988; Enelow & 
Hinich, 1984).   
 A third characteristic of the spatial theory of voting is that legislators have 
information about other legislators’ policy preferences.  Although each legislator may not 






















theory that legislators have an idea as to other legislator’s policy preferences (Krehbiel, 
1988).   
 These aforementioned characteristics describe the spatial theory of voting.  To 
summarize, the spatial theory of voting assumes that legislators vote on policies based on 
their own policy preferences, legislators have single peaked policy preferences on 
policies, and legislators have information on other legislator’s policy preferences. 
   
Studies Employing the Spatial Theory of Voting 
 
 A number of studies have utilized the spatial theory of voting to assess legislative 
decision making (e.g., Bailey & Chang, 2001; Jenkins & Sala, 1998).  However, as stated 
earlier, no study has utilized the spatial theory of voting to analyze state legislative 
decision making as it pertains to higher education funding.  This next section will review 
the literature that has employed the spatial theory of voting and describe how this theory 
can be used in this study.  
Previous studies utilizing the spatial theory of voting to analyze legislative 
decision making include those by Bailey and Chang (2001), Jenkins and Sala (1998), and 
McCarty and Poole (1995).  In an article by Bailey and Chang (2001), the authors 
employed the spatial theory of voting to analyze US Presidents, US Senators, and 
Supreme Court Justices.  In particular, the authors attempted to place the policy 
preferences of these three groups on a common scale.   Bailey and Chang (2001) 
analyzed Solicitor General court briefs to estimate the policy preferences of US 
Presidents, assessed Supreme Court briefs to study policy preferences of Supreme Court 
Justices, and studied US Senate roll call votes to estimate Senatorial policy preferences.  
Employing a random-effects model, the authors collected ideal points of US Presidents, 
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Supreme Court Justices, and US Senators to create a common preference scale across 
these three groups.  The authors argued that this common preference scale would allow 
future scholars to study political decision making across these three groups (Bailey & 
Chang, 2001).   Overall, this study effectively utilized the spatial theory of voting to 
assess the political policy preferences of three different groups of political actors.   
 Other studies employing the spatial theory of voting have benefited from the 
research conducted by Poole and Rosenthal (1987, 1991, 2001, and 2007).  Poole and 
Rosenthal (1987, 2001, and 2007) developed measures of ideal points for members of the 
US Congress from 1789 to the early 2000’s.  These ideal points have been utilized in a 
variety of studies to examine the policy decisions made by members of the US Congress 
for over two hundred years (e.g., Jenkins & Sala, 1998; Platt, Poole, & Rosenthal, 1992; 
Jenkins & Nokken, 2000).  
In a study by McCarty and Poole (1995), the authors utilized the spatial theory of 
voting to estimate US President’s policy preferences at different points in time.  
Additionally, the authors used data developed by Poole and Rosenthal (2001, 2007) to 
examine the policy preferences of members of the US Congress.  Taken together, the 
authors sought to understand how influential the US President was over Congressional 
legislation.  The authors created an original method to assess the policy preferences of 
US Presidents which was based on the President’s public position on policy issues and 
found that the US President was able to influence policies in the US Congress.  Overall, 
the study by McCarty and Poole (1995) effectively employed the spatial theory of voting 
to analyze the policy preferences of US Presidents and the US Congress.  
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  In a different study employing the spatial theory of voting, Jenkins and Sala 
(1998) used the ideal points developed by Poole & Rosenthal (1997).  Jenkins and Sala 
(1998) analyzed the 1825 Presidential election and examined whether the ideal points of 
members of Congress in 1825 were similar to the Presidential winner in the election.  The 
authors conducted a difference of means test and found that the ideal points of the elected 
President’s, John Quincy Adams, were consistent with Congressional ideal points.  
Therefore, the authors concluded that ideal points of Congress predicted the observed 
behavior of the Presidential election (Jenkins & Sala, 1997).  Similar to previous research 
(e.g., McCarty & Poole, 1995), the study by Jenkins and Sala (1998) effectively 
employed the spatial theory of voting to assess the influence of legislators’ policy 
preferences on political outcomes.  
 In a different study, Platt, Poole, and Rosenthal (1992) sought to examine whether 
Congressional voting behavior was associated with the ideal points developed by Poole 
and Rosenthal (1991).  They compared measures of policy preferences developed by a 
different group of researchers (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989) to the measure of policy 
preferences from the study by Poole and Rosenthal (1991).  Assuming the spatial theory 
of voting drove Congressional behavior, the authors determined that the measures of 
policy preferences developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1991) were more representative of 
Congressional voting behavior compared to the measures of policy preferences developed 
by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989).  This analysis was similar to a study by Jenkins 
and Nokken (2000) in which the authors studied the 34th House of Representatives in the 
US Congress.  Specifically, the authors sought to understand how the policy preferences 
of this Congress influenced the speakership election in 1855-56.  The authors were 
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guided by the spatial theory of voting and utilized the measures of policy preferences of 
the US Congress developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1997).  They concluded that 
the measures of policy preferences were influential in determining the speakership 
election.  Therefore, the studies by Platt et al. (1992) and Jenkins and Nokken (2000) 
utilized the spatial theory of voting and found that policy preferences influenced 
legislative decision making.   
 In sum, a number of studies have employed the spatial theory of voting to assess 
decisions made by US Presidents, US Congress, and the Supreme Court (e.g., Jenkins & 
Nokken, 2000; Platt et al., 1992; Rabinowtiz & Macdonald, 1989).  Additionally, the 
measures of ideal points developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1987, 1991, 2001, 2007) 
have been heavily utilized in recent literature (e.g., Jenkins & Sala, 2000; Platt et al., 
1992; McCarty & Poole, 1995) to assess the influence of policy preferences on different 
policy outcomes.   However, as previously mentioned, the spatial theory of voting has not 
been utilized in studies assessing state legislative behavior, such as appropriations to 
higher education.      
 
The Spatial Theory of Voting to Guide this Study 
 
 Shor and McCarty (2011) stated that there are two main reasons why the spatial 
theory of voting has not been utilized in literature on state legislative decision making.  
The first reason is that state legislator voting data has not been collected for all 50 US 
states.  Therefore, a lack of voting data would not allow for adequate measures of 
legislator policy preferences.  The second reason is that legislator voting data has not 
been collected over time.   Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner (2010) also 
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recognized that state legislator voting data has not been collected across states and over 
time.  Berry et al. (2010) wrote about this limitation: 
 
Recently, scholars have made significant advancements in the measurement of 
state public opinion and state legislator ideal points (e.g., Bafumi & Herron 2007; 
Park, Gelman, & Bafumi 2004; Shor, Berry, & McCarty 2007). However, these 
alternative measures are currently available only for scattered states and/or years, 
thereby precluding their use in pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis. If valid 
direct measures of state citizen and government ideology eventually become 
available for the 50 states over a sufficient period of years, we would certainly 
favor using them over BRFH’s less direct proxies. (p. 130) 
 
Therefore, both studies by Shor and McCarty (2011) and Berry et al. (2010) recognized 
two main reasons for the lack of studies on the spatial theory of voting in studies 
investigating state legislative behavior: legislator policy preferences have not been 
collected for across all US states and has not been consistently collected over time.   
  Shor and McCarty (2011) recently developed a new dataset composed of state 
legislative policy preferences within all US states over a number of years.  Specifically, 
Shor and McCarty (2011) collected roll call votes in state legislatures from 1993 to 2009.  
In addition, the authors developed a new technique to compare policy preferences across 
state legislatures.  Shor and McCarty (2011) utilized a survey conducted by Project 
Votesmart National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) to aid in their analysis.  This 
survey asks questions on policy stances of incoming legislators in all states, allowing for 
a direct comparison of issue stances of legislators across states.  Combining the state roll 
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call voting data with the survey responses, Shor and McCarty (2011) created a robust 
dataset for researchers to use in studies seeking to understand the influence of state 
legislative policy preferences on state policy outcomes.  In particular, the data set 
contains measures of policy preferences for each state legislature which can be arranged 
on a continuum depicting more liberal state legislatures on one end of the continuum and 
more conservative legislatures on the other end of the continuum.   
 The dataset compiled by Shor and McCarty (2011) more appropriately measures 
policy preferences for members of the state legislator compared to earlier research (e.g., 
Bailey & Chang, 2001; Berry et al., 1998; Berry et al., 2010; Jenkins & Sala, 1998; Poole 
& Rosenthal, 1987, 1991, 2001, 2007; McCarty & Poole, 1995).  In particular, the 
measures developed by Shor and McCarty (2011) do not utilize measures of policy 
preferences of the US Congress or state citizenry as a proxy for state legislators.  Rather, 
using roll call voting data of state legislators and survey data of state legislator policy 
preferences, Shor and McCarty (2011) have created a data set that directly represents 
state legislative policy preferences.  
 In summary, prior studies analyzed how the Democratic controlled legislatures or 
Republican controlled legislatures influenced higher education appropriations (e.g., 
Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Dar, 2012; Hossler et al., 1997; McLendon et al., 2009; 
Tandberg, 2008).  Within these studies there have been some conflicting results; 
however, most studies found that Democratic controlled legislatures are typically 
associated with higher levels of funding for higher education.  However, Shor and 
McCarty (2011) portrayed that Democratic legislators, in certain areas of the U.S., are 
more conservative than Republican legislators in other parts of the country.  “For 
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example, the Democratic party in Mississippi is more conservative than the relatively 
liberal Republican parties of Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island” (Shor & McCarty, 2011, p. 537).  The new 
measures of state legislator policy preferences collected by Shor and McCarty (2011) can 
help clarify the differences in policy preferences with a political party from state to state.  
Therefore, these new measures of policy preferences can improve upon the limitations of 
previous higher education research assessing the influence of policy preferences on 
higher education appropriations.  This study intends to capitalize on these new, more 
accurate, measures of policy preferences to assess how state legislator policy preferences 





This review of the literature discussed previous studies evaluating the influencers 
of state appropriations to higher education.  Studies reviewed include research depicting 
the influence of student enrollments on higher education appropriations, studies assessing 
how state economic conditions affect higher education appropriations, and studies 
focusing on how political variables influence higher education funding.  Overall, these 
studies have shown that prior state appropriations to higher education, state 
characteristics, competing budget items, higher education interest groups, higher 
education governance structures, divided legislature, political party of the governors, and 
gubernatorial strength influence higher education appropriations.  Further, recent studies 
have shown that certain political variables influence higher education appropriations.   
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This study intends to advance the research on the influence of political variables 
on higher education funding.  In particular, this study will employ the spatial theory of 
voting which has been shown to effectively guide studies analyzing legislative decision 
making.  However, this theory has not been utilized in previous literature analyzing state 
legislative decision making as it pertains to higher education funding.   Further, this study 
will utilize new measures of policy preferences developed by Shor and McCarty (2011) 
to address the following research questions: 
 
1. How do prior state appropriations to higher education, 
state characteristics, higher education governance systems, 
competing budget items, higher education interest groups, 
political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided 
legislature, and other unobservable variables influence state 
spending on higher education? 
 
2. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
governance systems, competing budget items, higher education 
interest groups, political party of the governors, gubernatorial 
strength, divided legislature, and other unobservable variables, 





3. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
governance systems, competing budget items, political party of 
the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and 
other unobservable variables, how do policy preferences 
varying with higher education interest groups influence state 
spending on higher education? 
 
A diagram depicting this analysis is displayed in Figure 2.1. 
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Using the spatial theory of voting and advanced statistical techniques, this study 
examines the influence of state legislator policy preferences and higher education interest 
groups on state funding to higher education, controlling for other variables.  This chapter 
re-introduces the research questions and describes the data for this study.  Additionally, 
this chapter presents the variables and description of the appropriate quantitative 
techniques for this study.  A discussion of the limitations is found at the conclusion of the 
chapter.   
 
Research Questions 
       This study examines how policy preferences and higher education interest groups 
influence annual state appropriations to higher education, controlling for other variables.  
The following research questions will be addressed: 
  
1. How do prior state appropriations to higher education, 
state characteristics, higher education governance systems, 
competing budget items, higher education interest groups, 
political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided 
legislature, and other unobservable variables influence state 




2. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
governance systems, competing budget items, higher education 
interest groups, political party of the governors, gubernatorial 
strength, divided legislature, and other unobservable variables, 
how do policy preferences influence state spending on higher 
education? 
 
3. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
governance systems, competing budget items, political party of 
the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and 
other unobservable variables, how do policy preferences 
varying with higher education interest groups influence state 
spending on higher education? 
 
Data 
 This study utilizes data from a variety of sources.  The data source for annual state 
appropriations to higher education come from an annual compilation of state financial 
support for higher education provided by Grapevine, a data compilation project at Illinois 
State University.  Grapevine has been collecting data on state support for higher 
education through an annual survey for over 50 years.  On each annual survey, states are 
asked to report annual expenditures to all institutions of higher education within their 
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state, including public and private institutions.  However, states are only asked to provide 
expenditures for operational expenditures, but not capital expenditures for higher 
education.  Grapevine has made available all state higher education expenditure data for 
years 1960 through 2012, via their website. 
Data on policy preferences is collected from a recent publication by Boris Shor 
and Nolan McCarty (2012), titled, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.  
This publication contains a dataset of state legislative policy preference scores.  To 
construct the dataset, Shor and McCarty (2012) utilized two sets of information: First, the 
authors used the Project Votesmart National Political Awareness Test (NPAT).  The 
NPAT is an annual survey given to state and federal legislative candidates and asks 
policy specific questions on topics including; social issues, environmentalism, national 
security, fiscal policy, criminal justice, foreign policy, domestic issues, and education.  
The results of each survey are compiled to create a NPAT policy preference score for 
each survey responder.  This policy preference score is intended to represent the policy 
preferences of the survey responder.  These scores can be compared across responders, 
and over time, to understand policy preferences of incoming state legislators. 
Though the results of the NPAT survey can give clear depictions of legislator 
policy preference, only about one-third of legislators complete the survey.  Therefore, it 
does not capture legislator policy preference for all state legislators.  In order to capture 
policy preferences for all state legislators, Shor and McCarty (2011) supplemented the 
NPAT survey data with a second data source.  In particular, the authors collected roll call 
voting data of state legislators from all 50 U.S. states.  To do so, they developed data-
mining scripts to capture the roll call votes from each state’s journal records.  Through 
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this data collection effort, Shor and McCarty (2011) were able to compile roll call votes 
for over 14,000 state legislators from the mid-1990’s through 2010.   
 Shor and McCarty (2011) utilized ordinary least squares regression analysis to 
predict NPAT scores based on the roll call voting data.  Through this method, the authors 
were able to provide NPAT policy preference scores for all legislators, including those 
that did not complete the NPAT Survey.  Therefore, by combining NPAT survey results 
and roll call voting data, the authors compiled a dataset of policy preference for all state 
legislators from 1996 through 2010.  The dataset compiled by Shor and McCarty (2011) 
represents the first national collation of state legislator policy preference.  Prior to their 
collection, scholars were using proxies of state legislator policy preferences to conduct 
analyses (e.g., McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Tandberg, 2008).   
A different dataset compiled by The Education Commission of the States, 
contains information on higher education governance structures.  This data, which are 
developed in partnership with the National Center for Higher Education Management 
Systems and the State Higher Education Executive Officers, offers a description of 
whether a state has a state level coordinating agency and/or governing board for higher 
education.  This data was first collected in 1997, and has been updated in 2000 and 2007.   
Higher education interest group data is collected from a dataset created by David 
Tandberg.  Tandberg looked at how many higher education interest groups are within 
each U.S. state each year, relative to the total number of interest groups within each state.  
Through this analysis, he created a ratio of total higher education interest groups over 
total interest groups within each state.  Tandberg (2013) collected state higher education 
interest group data through 2011. 
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Data on state Medicaid expenditures is collected from The Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services publications on Health expenditure reports by state.  These annual 
reports, electronically available from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, provide the 
total dollar amount spent on Medicaid by each state in the U.S. starting from 1991 
through 2010. 
State prison expenditures data is compiled from The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 
State Correction Expenditures tables.  These publicly available tables list total prison 
expenditures, for each U.S. state, from the 1980’s through 2010. 
Additionally, K-12 education funding data is collected from the National Center 
for Education Statistics (NCES).  NCES has an annual table listing state expenditures to 
elementary and secondary education, titled Current expenditures for public elementary 
and secondary education, by state or jurisdiction: Selected years, 1969-70 through 2008-
09.  This data can be directly accessed from the NCES website (U.S. Department of 
Education. Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics). 
Data on the political party of the US governors is collected from the Governor’s 
Dataset from Klarner (2013).  This dataset lists the terms and political parties of all US 
current and historic US governors.  Gubernatorial strength is collected from The 
Institutional Power Ratings for the 50 Governors of the United States, a dataset managed 
by Thad Beyle (2013) which calculates gubernatorial power for each current and previous 
US governors.  Prior higher education studies examining the influence of gubernatorial 
power have also utilized Beyle’s data within their studies (e.g., McLendon et al., 2009).  
Divided and unified government data is collected from the U.S. Census, Statistical 




The dependent variable in this study, state appropriations to higher education, is 
hypothesized to be influenced by a number of political variables, including the political 
preferences of the state legislators and higher education interest groups.  Both of these 
political variables, political preferences of state legislators and higher education interests 
groups are based on constructs from the spatial theory of voting. 
Figure 3.1 shows these two independent variables, political preferences of state 
legislators and state higher education interest groups, along with the other state-level 
variables hypothesized to influence state appropriations to higher education.  
Additionally, the dependent variable, state appropriations to higher education, is depicted 
in Figure 3.1.  Overall, the theoretical framework in this study allows for an examination 
of the influence of political preferences of state legislators, higher education interest 
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 The dependent variable in this study, state appropriations to higher education, is 
defined as the annual amount of state funding to higher education per capita.  Levels of 
appropriations to higher education are expressed in terms of per capita in order to 
represent the level of state financial support relative to the state’s total population.  This 
variable is calculated by dividing the total state appropriations by the total state 
population.  Data for total state appropriations to higher education is taken from 
Grapevine’s annual reports on state tax appropriations to higher education.  Data on the 
total state population is collected from the U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates 
data.  The state tax appropriations data from Grapevine Data is adjusted for inflation by 




 This study includes a number of state-level independent variables.  Findings from 
previous research on variables influencing state appropriations to higher education, 
theory, and data availability determine the selection of independent variables in this 




Prior state appropriations to higher education:  Previous research showed that states’ 
previous appropriations to higher education were positively associated with current state 
appropriations to higher education (e.g., Tandberg, 2008).  Moreover, some researchers 
determined that a state’s previous year’s appropriation levels were the most significant 
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predictor of the current year’s appropriation level (e.g., Hossler, Lund, Ramin, Westfall, 
& Irish, 1997; Wildavsky, 1964) Therefore, prior year’s appropriation levels is included 
as an independent variable in this study.  This variable is represented as a lagged value of 








































Table 3.1. Variables Included in the Analysis 
 
Variable Name Description 
Dependent  
Current Year State Appropriations to 
Higher Education 
Dollar amount of annual amount of state funding to higher 
education per capita. 
  
Independent  
State Appropriations  
Prior year state appropriations to          
higher education 
Dollar amount of previous year’s annual amount of state 
appropriations to higher education per capita. 
  
State Characteristics  
Unemployment Rate Number of unemployed people divided by all individuals in 
the labor force (percentage). 
Tax and Expenditure limitations laws Tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) policy in a state (1 = 
yes, 0 = no). 
Per capita Total Enrollment in higher 
education  
Per capita total enrollment in higher education institutions 
within a state. 
Share of higher education enrollment in 
private institutions 
Number of total enrollments in private higher education 
divided by all enrollments in higher education, within a state 
(percentage). 
  
Competing Budget Items  
K-12 Expenditures Dollar amount of K-12 expenditures per capita. 
Medicaid Expenditures Dollar amount of Medicaid expenditures per capita. 
Prison Expenditures Dollar amount of prison expenditures per capita. 
  
Political Variables  
State Legislator Political Preferences Policy preference scores for the state legislature, averaged for 
the House and Senate. 
Higher Education Interest Groups Ratio of higher education interest groups relative to all 
interest groups within a state (percentage). 
Republican Governor Party of the Governor (Democrat = 0 or Republican = 1) 
Gubernatorial Strength 
 
Compilation of Governor’s appointment power, budgetary 
power, veto power, and tenure potential. 
Divided Legislature Divided or unified state legislature (divided = 1, unified = 0) 
 
Higher Education Governance Systems 
 
Governance System State higher education governance system (3 = coordinating 
agency, 2 = governing board, 1 = both coordinating agency 











Unemployment rate: Unemployment rate is a variable calculated by the United States 
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.  This variable is calculated as the 
number of unemployed people divided by all individuals in the labor force (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2013).  The Bureau has tables depicting each state’s unemployment rate, 
on an annual basis, for over one hundred years.  Prior studies have often included a 
state’s unemployment rate when examining what influences state appropriations to higher 
education, finding that states with lower rates of unemployment were associated with 
increased higher education funding (e.g., Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998).  Therefore, in 
order to assess the possible variables that influence state appropriations to higher 
education, this study includes states’ unemployment rates as one of the independent 
variables. 
 
Tax and Expenditure limitations laws: Many states adopted tax and expenditure 
limitation (TEL) policies in the late 1970’s.  These policies were adopted in order to 
legally cap the total state appropriations to certain state agencies, including higher 
education institutions.  Archibald and Feldman (2006) found that states with TELs were 
negatively associated with higher education funding.  McLendon et al., (2009) also 
examined whether TELs were predictors of higher education funding.  However, the 
authors did not find this variable to be statistically significant in their study.  Therefore, 
there have been mixed results as to whether TELs influence state appropriations to higher 
education.  This study attempts to examine how TELs influence higher education 
appropriations.  This variable is measured as a categorical, dummy variable; states are 
coded as to whether they do (coded as 1) or do not (coded as 0) have a TEL.  Data on 
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TELs is collected from the publicly accessible information found at the National 
Conference of State Legislatures website (Waisanen, 2010).  
Enrollments in higher education: Previous literature has depicted the influence of higher 
education enrollment within a state on state appropriations to higher education (e.g., 
Clotfelter, 1976; Delaney & Doyle, 2011; Leslie & Ramey, 1986; Peterson, 1976; 
Strathman, 1994).  In particular, authors have found that, at times, per capita enrollments 
in higher education positively influenced state appropriations to higher education.  Within 
this study, enrollment is measured as the number of total enrollments in higher education 
per capita.  This data comes from the National Center on Education Statistics Digest of 
Education Statistics.  Annual measures of state higher education enrollments from 1998 
to 2009 are collected in the Digest and are included as a variable in this study to examine 
whether current per capita enrollments in higher education within a state influence state 
appropriations to higher education. 
 
Share of higher education enrollment in private institutions: Previous research has 
examined the influence of the share of enrollments in private institutions, compared to 
enrollment in public institutions, on bachelor’s degree production within states (Titus, 
2009) and on state appropriations to higher education (McLendon et al., 2009).  A study 
by McLendon et al., (2009) found that states with higher shares of enrollment in private 
higher education institutions were associated with lower levels of state appropriations to 
higher education.  Therefore, the share of higher education enrollment in private 
institutions within a state is included as an independent variable within this study.  The 
share of higher education enrollment in private institutions is collected from the National 
Center on Education Statistics Digest of Education Statistics.  This variable is calculated 
 78 
 
by dividing the number total enrollments in private higher education institutions by total 
enrollment in all higher education institutions (public and private). 
 
Competing Budget Items 
K-12 expenditures: A variety of literature has sought to understand if and how state K-12 
expenditures influenced expenditures in other state budget categories, such as higher 
education (e.g., Kane, Orszag, & Apostolov, 2005; Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998).  
Toukoushian and Hollis (1998) and Okuande (2004) found that funding for K-12, at 
times, competed with funding for higher education.  These findings are consistent with 
the results of a study by Kane et al., (2005).  Therefore, state K-12 expenditures is 
included in this study to examine how competing state budget items influence state 
appropriations to higher education.  Data on state expenditures for K-12 education is 
collected from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  NCES publishes 
annual reports depicting the total state expenditures for K-12 education across all states.  
Furthermore, this variable is measured as K-12 expenditures per capita, in order to 
represent the level of state financial support relative to the state’s population.  Because 
the dependent variable (state higher education appropriations) is also measured per 
capita, variables representing competing state budget items are normalized in the same 
manner.  Data for K-12 expenditures is adjusted for inflation by using a Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) Inflation Multiplier Calculator to reflect funding in 2010 dollars. 
 
Medicaid expenditures:  Previous researchers have investigated whether state Medicaid 
expenditures influenced state appropriations to higher education (e.g., Kane et al., 2005; 
Okunade, 2004; Zumeta, 2004).  These authors found that Medicaid expenditures did 
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influence higher education appropriations.  Specifically, both studies determined that 
state spending on Medicaid, which has dramatically increased over the last 20-30 years, 
has negatively affected higher education funding.  Overall, previous research depicts that 
as Medicaid spending increases, state funding to higher education decreases (Kane et al., 
2005; Okunade, 2004; Zumeta, 2004).  Therefore, this study includes Medicaid 
expenditures as an independent variable.  State Medicaid spending data is drawn from 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services publications on Health expenditure 
reports by state.  The figures for annual state expenditures to Medicaid are measured by 
per capita within a state and adjusted for inflation by using a Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Inflation Multiplier Calculator to express funding in 2010 dollars. 
 
Prison expenditures: Prison expenditures have also been included in previous research in 
an attempt to understand whether this state budget item influences state appropriations to 
higher education (e.g., Okunade, 2004).  Okunade (2004) found a complementary 
relationship between prison expenditures and higher education expenditures in states.  
Therefore, this study examines whether state prison expenditures influence higher 
education expenditures.  Data on state prison expenditures comes directly from The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics State Correction Expenditures data tables.  Like data on K-12 
expenditures and Medicaid expenditures, prison expenditures are measured on a per 
capita basis.  Data on prison expenditures is adjusted for inflation by using a Consumer 







Higher Education Governance Systems 
Governance system: Several studies have investigated whether state higher education 
governance systems influence state appropriations to higher education (e.g., McLendon et 
al., 2009; Weerts, 2002).  The aforementioned studies have produced mixed results in 
regards to the influence of higher education governance systems on state appropriations 
to higher education. Weerts (2002) found that consolidated governing agencies were 
associated with higher levels of state appropriations to higher education while McLendon 
et al., (2009) found no association between a state’s higher education governance 
structure and state appropriations to higher education.  Given these mixed results, this 
study includes state higher education governance systems  as an independent variable and 
examines whether states with a coordinating agency, states with a governing board, states 
with both a coordinating agency and governing board, or states with neither a 
coordinating agency nor governing board influence state appropriations to higher 
education.  Governance system data is compiled from The Education Commission of the 
States online database of Postsecondary Governance Structures. Within this study, this 
variable is reflected as a categorical, dummy variable (coordinating agency, governing 
board, both a coordinating agency and governing board, neither a coordinating agency 





State Legislator Policy Preferences: Political preferences have been utilized in previous 
research to understand the influence of policy preferences on state appropriations to 
higher education (e.g., Dar, 2012; McLendon et al., 2009).  These studies have found that 
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legislator policy preferences have influenced state appropriations to higher education.  In 
particular, authors have determined that states with more liberal legislator policy 
preferences were associated with higher levels of state appropriations to higher education 
while states with more conservative legislator policy preferences were associated with 
lower spending levels on higher education.  However, no study has accurately measured 
the policy preference of state legislators.  Rather, these studies (e.g., Dar, 2012; 
McLendon et al., 2009) utilized a proxy for state legislator policy preferences: the policy 
preferences of members of U.S. Congress, in lieu of a direct measure of state legislator 
policy preferences.  Because state legislators are the political actors deciding on state 
appropriations to higher education, this study utilizes a direct measure of state legislator 
policy preferences to examine how legislators’ policy preferences influence state 
appropriations to higher education. 
New data by Shor and McCarty (2011) directly measures state legislator policy 
preferences.  The authors utilized roll call voting scores and data from the National 
Political Awareness Test to compile a dataset measuring state legislative policy 
preferences for each state.  This data can be utilized to examine whether state legislators’ 
policy preferences influence state appropriations to higher education.  However, in 
contrast to previous literature depicting the influence of policy preferences on state 
appropriations to higher education, this study utilizes a variable that directly measures the 
state legislator policy preferences.  Specifically, this study utilizes variables found in the 
Shor and McCarty (2011) dataset which measures the median policy preferences, for 
each year and within each legislative chamber (House and Senate).  Found within the 
publicly available dataset by Shor and McCarty (2011), the variable hou_chamber and 
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sen_chamber reflects the median policy preference scores for both the House and Senate 
within each state.  In this study, these variables (hou_chamber and sen_chamber) are 
averaged together, representing state legislator policy preferences. 
 
Higher Education Interest Groups: David Tandberg has conducted numerous studies 
examining the influence of state higher education interest groups on state appropriations 
to higher education (e.g., Tandberg, 2008; Tandberg & Ness, 2011).  He has consistently 
found that state higher education interest groups, relative to all interest groups within a 
state, were positively associated with higher education funding.  Therefore, the ratio of 
higher education interest groups in a state is included in this study to understand the 
influence of higher education interest groups, relative to all interest groups in a state, on 
state appropriations to higher education.  Higher education interest group data is drawn 
from the database of higher education interests groups that David Tandberg has collected.  
This data includes information on interest groups from the 1980’s and has been updated 
to include data through 2011 (Tandberg, 2013). 
Republican Governor: A number of prior studies depicted the influence of the political 
party of the governors on state appropriations to higher education (e.g., McLendon et al., 
2009; Rizzo, 2006).  Specifically, the authors determined that Republican governors were 
typically associated with lower funding levels to higher education compared to 
Democratic governors.  Thus, the political party of the governor is an additional 
independent variable in this study, coded as a categorical, dummy variable.  A historic 
listing of the US Governors across all US states has been compiled by Klaner (2013).  
The scholar has a publicly available dataset which lists the years in which a governor was 
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in power within each state as well as political party affiliation of the governors. Data on 
the political party of the governors spans from the early 20th century through 2012.  
Gubernatorial Strength: A few previous studies have sought to understand the influence 
of the strength of the governor on state appropriations to higher education (e.g., 
McLendon et al., 2009; Peterson, 1976; Tandberg and Ness, 2011).  The authors found 
mixed results: Peterson (1976) determined that more powerful governors were associated 
with higher funding levels to higher education while McLendon et al., (2009) and 
Tandberg and Ness (2011) concluded that powerful governors were associated with lower 
funding levels to higher education.  Overall, due to previous findings in the literature, 
gubernatorial strength is included as an independent variable within this study.  Data on 
gubernatorial strength is collected from Thad Beyle’s datasets on gubernatorial power.  
The data includes information on four gubernatorial powers: appointment power, veto 
power, budgetary power, and tenure potential.  Beyle (2013) has compiled all four of 
these powers into one variable depicted the overall gubernatorial strength.  Furthermore, 
this variable is available within Beyle’s publicly available dataset, depicting the 
gubernatorial strength for all current and past US governors.  
Divided Legislature: Certain prior studies analyzing the influence of political variables on 
higher education funding have included an independent variable capturing whether a state 
had a unified or divided legislature (e.g, Tandberg, 2008, 2010).  Because this variable 
has been included in prior research studying the political influencers of higher education 
funding, it is included in this study as a categorical, dummy variable.  Data on whether a 
state has a divided or unified legislature comes from the U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States (2012). 
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In summary, the aforementioned variables have been compiled to form a panel 
dataset.  Panel data contains cross-sectional time-series data.  Cross-sectional data are 
collected from several locations or units at one point in time.  Time-series data are 
collected from the same location or unit over successive time intervals.  This study 





This study examines how state legislator policy preferences and higher education 
interest groups influence state appropriations to higher education, controlling for other 
variables. Before utilizing more advanced statistical techniques, this study first provides 
descriptive statistics.  Previous quantitative studies investigating the relationship between 
higher education and other outcomes and state appropriations to higher education 
provided descriptive statistics of the variables in the studies before employing advanced 
statistical techniques (e.g., Delaney & Doyle, 2011; McLendon et al., 2009).  
Specifically, descriptive statistics including the mean, median, minimum, and maximum 
values for all variables will be calculated.  Proportions will also be calculated for all 
categorical variables to understand the distribution of these variables.   
After examining the results of the descriptive statistics, more advanced statistical 
analyses will be employed to explore the influence of state characteristics (e.g., higher 
education enrollments, prior appropriation levels), higher education governance systems, 
competing budget items, and unobservable variables within states on state appropriations 
to higher education.  The most appropriate method to examine how a number of 
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observable variables and other unobservable variables in a panel data set affect an 
outcome is panel data analysis. 
There are several panel data analysis techniques that have been employed in 
higher education research.  The most commonly utilized panel data analysis techniques 
are fixed-effects and random-effects regression (Zhang, 2010).  Both fixed-effects and 
random-effects regression analyses explore the relationship between independent 
variables and a dependent variable.  However, fixed-effects regression is utilized to 
control for individual or unit (e.g., states) heterogeneity (Zhang, 2010).  Applied to this 
study, a fixed-effects analysis would take into account unobservable state characteristics 
that are influencing the dependent variable, state appropriations to higher education.  In 
contrast, random-effects models are utilized when observable variables are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the unit group or the state error.  Therefore, either a fixed-effects or 
random-effects panel data analysis may be employed for this type of study.  Typically a 
Hausman test is conducted to determine whether a fixed-effects or random-effects model 
is most appropriate, as shown through previous higher education studies (e.g., McLendon 
et al., 2009).   
In previous studies assessing the influencers of state appropriations to higher 
education, numerous authors found that certain independent variables were correlated 
with the error (e.g., Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011; McLendon et al., 2009; Tandberg & 
Ness, 2011). Similarly, in this study, it is assumed that the independent variables, such as 
the state characteristics, are correlated with the error.  Fixed-effects models are most 
appropriate to utilize when independent variables are correlated with the error (Zhang, 
2010).  In addition, according to Zhang (2010), fixed-effects regression analysis is a 
 86 
 
preferred technique when a limited number of years are available for analysis.  Therefore, 
similar to previous higher education studies examining the influence of state 
appropriations to higher education (e.g., Delaney & Doyle, 2007, 2011; McLendon et al., 
2009; Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998; and Kane et al., 2005), a fixed-effects model should 
be considered for this study.  
Although fixed-effects models have been employed in similar studies, a dynamic 
fixed-effects panel (DFEP) model is a more appropriate method for this study for a few 
reasons.  First, several researchers suggest the use of a dynamic fixed-effects panel model 
when a lag of the dependent variable is included as an independent variable within panel 
data (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Curs, Bhandari, & Steiger, 2011; Titus, 2009).  One of the 
independent variables in this study, prior year’s appropriations to higher education, is a 
lag of the dependent variable (current year’s appropriations to higher education).  
Therefore, due to the presence of a lag of the dependent variable, a dynamic fixed-effects 
panel model is the most appropriate technique to employ in this study.   
Second, previous higher education researchers recommended the use of a 
dynamic fixed-effects panel model to account for unobserved state-specific fixed-effects 
and time-related fixed-effects (e.g., Titus, 2009).  Applied to this study, a dynamic fixed-
effects panel model will account for unobservable variables specific to each state and 
over time while taking into account other unobservable variables that are of less interest. 
Additionally, Titus (2009) suggested the use of a dynamic fixed-effects panel 
model to account for possible endogeneity of one or more of the independent variables.  
Therefore, a third reason for employing a dynamic fixed-effects panel model is because 
this method takes into account possible endogeneity of one or more of the independent 
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variables.  When utilizing panel data analysis techniques such as fixed- or random-effects 
regression, it is assumed that all independent variables are exogenous (Zhang, 2010).  
However, some of the independent variables within this study, such as state legislator 
policy preferences, may be endogenous.  Thus, a dynamic fixed-effects panel model is 
utilized in this study to take into account possible endogeneity of one or more of the 
independent variables. 
As demonstrated by Titus (2009), dynamic fixed-effects panel models allow for 
an interpretation of how current higher education appropriations are influenced by prior 
levels of appropriations and predictors of higher education appropriations.  Utilizing prior 
levels of appropriations in this study will allow for an interpretation of the long term 
trend in growth, or decline, in state appropriations to higher education.  Further, because 
past predictors of state appropriations to higher education are included in a dynamic 
fixed-effects panel model, persistent effects of variables shown to influence current state 
appropriations to higher education are taken into account.  The past predictors of state 
appropriations to higher education are reflected as lagged values of the current predictors 
of state appropriations to higher education in this study.   
Arellano (1989) showed that biased estimates are often produced when utilizing 
dynamic fixed-effects panel models with higher order lags of the dependent variable and 
when using small samples.  Within this study, prior state appropriations to higher 
education and past predictors of state appropriations are higher order lags of the 
dependent variable and the independent variables, and the sample size is relatively small 
(11 years of data).  Other scholars (e.g., Arellano & Bover, 1995; Titus, 2009) suggest the 
use of a dynamic fixed-effects panel model combined with Generalized Method of 
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Moments (GMM) techniques to more accurately examine how lagged independent 
variables influence the dependent variable.  Utilizing a lagged dependent variable, lags of 
the endogenous predictor variables, and other exogenous variables, more accurate 
estimates can be examined by employing a dynamic fixed-effects panel model combined 
with GMM techniques.  When GMM techniques are employed, the endogenous 
independent variables are instrumented with the lags of the differenced values of the 
exogenous variables and the endogenous variables, as demonstrated by Titus (2009).  
Moreover, because this study contains a short time period (11 years), the use of  weak 
instruments allows for more robust parameter estimates, as shown by Arellano and Bover 
(1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Titus (2009).   In summary, as recommended by 
other researchers (e.g., Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; Titus, 2009), a 
dynamic fixed-effect panel model will be estimated via a system GMM estimator for this 
study.   
 
Dynamic Fixed-Effects Panel Models 
A system of equations can be utilized to portray the use of a dynamic fixed-effects 
panel model for this study.  In the first structural equation below (1), current state 
appropriations to higher education (St_Apprit) are a function (f) of prior appropriations to 
higher education (St_Apprit-1), state characteristics (SC it), higher education governance 
structures (HE it), competing budget items (CB it), divided legislature (DIV it), political 
party of the governors (GP it), gubernatorial strength (GS it), higher education interest 
groups (Int it), and state legislator policy preferences (Pref it): 
St_Apprit = f (St_Apprit-1, SC it, HE it, CB it, DIV it, GP it, GS it, Int it, Pref it)      (1) 
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Within Equation 1, i represents the state and t denotes time.  Combining the control 
variables (state characteristics, higher education governance structures, competing budget 
items, divided legislature, political party of the governors, and gubernatorial strength) 
produces the following reduced form of equation 1: 
                   (2) 
where  is state appropriations to higher education;  is the coefficient;  is the vector 
of endogenous variables including higher education interest groups and state legislator 
policy preferences;  is the vector of exogenous variables including the control 
variables;  is the state specific error term;  is the time specific error term; and  is 
the residual error.  Equation 3 shows the subtraction of each variable from the previous 
time period (i.e., first differences): 
   (3) 
The state specific error term ( ) does not vary across time periods, and is therefore 
excluded from Equation 3.  
 A number of researchers (e.g., Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; 
Nickell, 1981; Titus, 2009) concluded that ordinary least square (OLS) and fixed-effects 
regression analyses might lead to biased estimators of first-differenced models.  In 
particular, causality may be reversed between the endogenous predictors and the 
dependent variable.  To correct for biased estimators and the possible reverse causation in 
first-difference models, previous researchers (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 
1998; Titus, 2009) utilized system GMM estimation.  System GMM estimation includes 
past and future values of differences of strictly exogenous variables as instruments to 
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correct for reverse causation (Blundell & Bond, 1998).  Additionally, as shown by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), the system GMM estimator includes a matrix of the prior 
levels and differences of the lagged dependent and independent variables as instruments.  
Further, because system GMM may produce standard errors with a downward bias, 
system GMM is employed with a finite sample correction procedure for small samples 
(Windmeijer, 2004) in order to yield robust standard errors. Therefore, Equation 3 can be 
modified to include the system GMM estimator and will be employed to examine the first 
research question: How do state characteristics, higher education governance systems, 
competing budget items, higher education interest groups, divided legislature, political 
party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, and other unobservable variables influence 
state spending on higher education?   
               (4) 
Equation 4 represents a dynamic fixed-effects panel model with a GMM estimator where 
β is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable;  is state appropriations to higher 
education;  is the coefficient;  is the endogenous variable higher education interest 
groups;  is the vector of exogenous variables including the variables for state 
characteristics, competing budget items, higher education governance structures, divided 
legislature, political party of the governors, and gubernatorial strength;  is the state 
specific error term;  is the time specific error term; and  is the residual error.  This 
equation includes lags of the levels equations, as shown in Equation 2, and lags of the 
first-differences equations, as depicted in Equation 3. 
A slightly different equation (5) will be employed to address the second research 
question: Taking into account state characteristics, higher education governance systems, 
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competing budget items, higher education interest groups, divided legislature, political 
party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, and other unobservable variables, how do 
state legislator policy preferences influence state spending on higher education?  
             (5) 
In Equation 5, the variable state legislator policy preference is added to the vector of 
endogenous variables ( ).  A different equation (6) will be employed to address the 
third research question: 3. Taking into account prior state appropriations to higher 
education, state characteristics, higher education governance systems, competing budget 
items, political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and 
other unobservable variables, how do policy preferences varying with higher education 
interest groups influence state spending on higher education? 
          (6) 
 
This equation is similar to the equations 4 and 5 employed for the first second research 
questions, respectively.  However, in this equation,  is a vector that reflects the 
following variables: policy preferences, higher education interest groups, and the 
interaction of policy preferences and higher education interest groups.  These variables 
will be multiplied to examine how their interaction influences state appropriations to 
higher education.   
The Hansen J test, as demonstrated by Arellano and Bond (1991) is used as a 
post-estimation test to check for over-identifying restrictions in the model by examining 
whether the GMM-style instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.  As 
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demonstrated by Titus (2009), rejecting the null hypothesis (p <0.05) specifies that the 
instruments are not valid. 
 A violation of the assumptions of regression analysis may occur when employing 
a dynamic fixed-effects panel model.  In particular, serial correlation may be present.  In 
regression analysis, serial correlation refers to a correlation of the error terms across 
different time periods.   Applied to DFEP models, the Arellano-Bond test can be utilized 
to test for first- and second-orders serial correlation.  The Arellano-Bond test for first-
order correlation is expected to be statistically significant, which would verify the use of 
DFEP modeling.  However, the Arellano-Bond test for second-order correlation is not 
expected to be statistically significant, specifying that the variable transformations 




 This study may be limited in a few ways.  First, in dynamic fixed-effects panel 
data analysis, causality cannot be determined; rather, it can only be inferred.  Second, 
though this study intends to include all the independent variables influencing state 
appropriations to higher education, there may be other possible variables, not included in 
the analysis, which may influence the dependent variable. Third, this study is limited in 
the number of years included for analysis.  Because one of the key independent variables, 
state legislator policy preferences, has only been consistently collected for each state 





Interpretation of the Results 
The results of this study will be based on the outcomes of the statistical 
techniques described above.  For ease of interpretation of the results, all continuous 
variables are log transformed, which allows for an interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients in terms of percent change. 
Analyzing the results of the descriptive statistics will be conducted prior to 
assessing the results of the panel data analysis.  Understanding the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in this study shows the distribution of the data and reveals whether 
there are outliers or highly skewed variables.  Additionally, presenting the marginal 
effects shows how each independent variable influences the dependent variable at the 
mean, median and 25th/75th percentile of the dependent variable.  After reviewing the 
descriptive results, an interpretation of the panel data analysis can take place.  
Interpreting the results of the dynamic fixed-effects panel model shows how the political 
variables, including state legislator policy preferences, higher education interest groups, 
and the interaction of state legislator policy preferences and higher education interest 
groups, influence state appropriations to higher education, controlling for state 
characteristics, competing budget items, higher education governances structures, divided 








Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
Using the spatial theory of voting and advanced statistical techniques, this study 
examines the influence of state legislator policy preferences and higher education interest 
groups on state funding to higher education, controlling for other variables.  The 
following research questions are addressed in this study: 
 
1. How do prior state appropriations to higher education, 
state characteristics, higher education governance systems, 
competing budget items, higher education interest groups, 
political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided 
legislature, and other unobservable variables influence state 
spending on higher education? 
 
2. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
governance systems, competing budget items, higher education 
interest groups, political party of the governors, gubernatorial 
strength, divided legislature, and other unobservable variables, 





3. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
governance systems, competing budget items, political party of 
the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and 
other unobservable variables, how do policy preferences 
varying with higher education interest groups influence state 
spending on higher education? 
 
This chapter begins by presenting a number of descriptive statistics on the 
variables within this study, including; state demographic and economic characteristics, 
political variables, state appropriations to higher education, higher education governance 
structures, and competing budget items. After displaying the descriptive statistics, the 
results of the dynamic fixed-effects panel model estimated via Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM), techniques will be shown.   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
State Appropriations to Higher Education 
 The descriptive statistics, shown in Table 4.1, include information about the 
analytic sample of all 50 US states over a period of 12 years (1998 to 2009).  
Additionally, Table 4.1 depicts the descriptive statistics on state appropriations to higher 
education, per capita, expressed in 2009 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Inflation Multiplier Calculator. State appropriations to higher education, per capita, vary 
from a minimum of $95.30 per capita to a maximum of $563.47 per capita, portraying the 
fluctuation of funding to higher education across states and over this period of time. 
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Name 






to higher education      
   
State appropriations 
to higher education 
per capita (2009 
dollars) 256.59 72.36 95.30 563.47 207.52 293.15  
        
Competing budget 
items        
K-12 expenditures 
per capita (2009 
dollars) 1535.78 321.13 1015.94 2870.41 1310.42 1669.62  
Medicaid 
expenditures per 
capita (2009 dollars) 950.57 326.69 328.60 2463.20 752.01 1093.25  
Prison expenditures 
per capita (2009 
dollars) 155.61 57.31 1.93 437.83 119.62 181.00  
        
State Characteristics        
Unemployment Rate 5.0% 1.61% 2.30% 13.40% 3.9% 5.7%  
Tax and Expenditure 
limitations laws       49.0% 
Total Enrollment in 
higher education per 
capita 0.058 0.010 0.038 0.130 .050 .064  
Share of higher 
education enrollment 
in private institutions 22.85% 12.24% 3.19% 57.71% 14.00% 27.77%  
        
Political Variables        
State Legislator 
Political Preferences: 
House 0.082 0.516 -1.395 1.001 -.208 .492  
State Legislator 
Political Preferences: 
Senate 0.071 0.551 -1.166 1.024 -.426 .499  
Higher Education 
Interest Group Ratio 0.014 0.696 0.006 0.149 .028 .050  
Republican Governor       44.33% 
Gubernatorial 
Strength 3.47 0.42 2.50 4.30 3.2 3.8  
Divided legislature       23.47% 
 
Higher Education 
Governance Systems        
Coordinating Agency       53.27% 
Governing Board       41.12% 
Both Coordinating       
Agency and 
Governing Board  `      5.61% 
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State Demographic and Economic Characteristics 
 Table 4.1 depicts the descriptive statistics for state demographic and economic 
characteristics, including state unemployment rate, tax and expenditure limitation laws, 
share of higher education enrollment in private institutions, and total enrollment in higher 
education institution.  These statistics show that 49% of the states, during the period of 
1998 to 2009, had tax expenditure and limitation laws.   Furthermore, an average of 
22.85% of higher education enrollments was in private institutions across all states from 
1998 to 2009.  
 
Competing Budget Items 
 Similar to state appropriations to higher education, competing budget items were 
measured in 2009 dollars and per capita. As shown in Table 4.1, both K-12 expenditures 
and Medicaid expenditures, on average, were funded at significantly higher levels 
compared to higher education.  However, prison expenditures, on average, were funded at 
slightly lower levels compared to higher education expenditures.  
 
Political Variables 
 Descriptive statistics reveal that 44.33% of the US states, from 1998 to 2009, had 
a Republican Governor in power.  Additionally, 23.47% of the US states had a divided 
state legislature during the time period of the study, meaning that Republicans controlled 





Higher Education Governance Structures 
 Table 4.1 shows that 53.27% of the US states had a coordinating agency 
governance structure.  Additionally, 41.12% had a governing board governance structure 
and 5.61% had both a coordinating board and governing board from 1998 to 2009. 
 Statistical tests for correlation were employed to measure the relationship between 
the independent variables.  As depicted in Table A1 in the Appendix, a statistically 
significant correlation exists between the House and Senate state legislator policy 
preference scores (r = 0.8078).  Because of the correlation between the House and Senate 
policy preference, scores were averaged together for each state, for each year.  Averaging 
the House and Senate policy preferences to create a new variable is a technique utilized 
by other scholars to address the statistically significant correlation between the House and 
Senate policy preference scores (e.g., McGhee, Masket, Shor, Rogers and McCarty, 
2014).  
 
Results by Research Question 
 The results of each of the three research question are described in this chapter.   
 
Research Question 1 
 
How do prior state appropriations to higher education, state 
characteristics, higher education governance systems, 
competing budget items, higher education interest groups, 
political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided 
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legislature, and other unobservable variables influence state 
spending on higher education? 
  
 
Before examining the influence of state legislator policy preferences on 
state appropriations to higher education, a number of variables analyzed in 
previous literature are examined to determine their influence on state 
appropriations to higher education.  As outlined in Chapter 3, a dynamic fixed-
effects panel model estimated via Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
techniques is the most appropriate method to examine how a number of 
variables influence state spending on higher education. This method is most 
suitable because it allows for an interpretation of how current higher education 
appropriations are influenced by prior levels of appropriations and other 
predictors of higher education appropriations.  In particular, system GMM 
techniques combined with dynamic fixed-effects panel modeling produce 
efficient and precise estimates when examining a lag of the dependent variable 
and lags of the endogenous variables, along with other exogenous variables.  
 Utilizing the system GMM technique along with dynamic fixed-effects 
panel modeling, endogenous variables are instrumented with the lags of the 
differenced values of the endogenous variables and values of the exogenous 
variables.  When working with a small sample and short time periods, these 
instruments provide more precise and efficient estimates (Blundell & Bond, 
1998).   
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 When assessing the results of the dynamic fixed-effects panel model 
with system GMM techniques, a cutoff value of .05 is employed to evaluate the 
statistical significance of the overall model and coefficients.  Using this cutoff, 
Table 4.2 shows that the results of the dynamic fixed-effects panel model with 
system GMM techniques for the first research question is statistically 
significant [F(15,48) = 13.06; p<.001]. 
Two post-estimation tests should be examined to determine if a 
dynamic fixed-effects panel model with system GMM techniques is the most 
appropriate technique to address the research question.  First, the Hansen J 
statistic should be reviewed to ensure that the full set of instruments introduced 
into the model is valid.  The Hansen test specifies whether the exogenous 
variables are correlated with the error term.  The null hypothesis of the Hansen 
test is that instruments included in the model are exogenous and uncorrelated 
with the error.  In the model representing the results of the first research 
question, the Hansen J statistic depicts that instruments are exogenous and 
uncorrelated with the error (χ2 = 17.47; p<.10).   
 The second post-estimation test is the Arellano-Bond test for serial 
correlation.  This test examines whether there is autocorrelation between the 
lagged dependent variable and any other endogenous variables. The null 
hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test states that the variables are exogenous 
(autocorrelation is not present).  The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in 
the first-differenced residuals is expected to be significant, indicating that 
dynamic fixed-effects panel modeling is the appropriate technique.  Table 4.2 
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shows the Arellano-Bond results for autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
residuals (AR1) to be insignificant (Z = -2.89; p < .01).  The Arellano-Bond 
test also examines second-order serial correlation, which is expected to be 
statistically significant.  A statistically significant estimate for second-order 
serial correlation would indicate that the variable transformations have 
corrected for autocorrelation (Roodman, 2006).  As depicted in Table 4.2, the 
findings of the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation (AR2) 
depict that the model does not contain autocorrelation (Z = 0.38; p < .80). 
 As displayed in Table 4.2, prior appropriations to higher education, 
lagged one year, is positively related to current year appropriations to higher 
education (beta = 1.01; p<.001).   State-wide unemployment rate is not a 
statistically significant predictor of state appropriations to higher education 
(beta = -.09; p<.20).  K-12 appropriations is positively related to higher 
education appropriations (beta = -.70; p<.05). Medicaid appropriations is not a 
statistically significant predictor of higher education appropriations (beta = -
.04; p<.70).  Similarly, prison appropriations is not statistically significant 
(beta = -.06; p<.50) nor is higher education enrollment (beta = -.35; p<.20).  
Share of enrollment in private institutions is not statistically significant (beta 
=.02; p<.40) nor is higher education interest groups (beta = .03; p<.80).  
Gubernatorial strength is positively related to higher education appropriations 
(beta = 1.54; p<.05).  Tax and limitation policies is not statistically significant 
(beta = .03; p<.90) nor is gubernatorial political party (beta = .01; p<.90).  
Variables representing higher education governance structures are not 
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statistically significant: both a coordinating agency and governing board (beta 
= -1.52; p<.20); governing board (beta = -1.60; p<.20); coordinating agency 
(beta = -1.81; p<.20).  Divided legislature is not statistically significant (beta = 





















Table 4.2. Results by Research Question: Dynamic fixed-effects panel analysis 







Constant 4.469 3.961 5.561 
 (2.033) (1.316) (1.982) 
Prior year higher education 
appropriations 
1.013*** 0.560*** 0.727** 
 (0.215) (0.114) (0.212) 
State legislator policy preferences  -0.288**  
  (0.082)  
State legislator policy preferences * 
higher education interest groups 
  -0.856 
   (0.431) 
Unemployment rate -0.088 -0.067 -0.095 
 (0.061) (0.046) (0.070) 
K-12 appropriations -0.695* -0.026 -.0372 
 (0.293) (0.179) (0.301) 
Medicaid appropriations -0.043 -0.145 -0.189 
 (0.102) (0.086) (0.119) 
Prison appropriations -0.060 0.009 -0.000 
 (0.076) (0.048) (0.065) 
Higher education enrollment -0.345 0.152 0.119 
 (0.209) (0.184) (0.242) 
Share of enrollment in private 
higher education 
-0.082 -0.178* -0.228 
 (0.081) (0.087) (0.127) 
Higher education interest groups 0.017 0.027  
 (0.059) (0.060)  
Gubernatorial strength 1.536* 0.057 0.264 
 (0.667) (0.324) (0.402) 
Tax and expenditure limitation 
policy 
0.028 -0.033 -0.022 
 (0.119) (0.066) (0.063) 
Political party of the Governor 0.006 -0.020 0.006 
 (0.818) (0.037) (0.039) 
Higher education governance 
structure 
   
Coordinating agency and 
governing board 
-1.524 0.149 0.161 
 (1.128) (0.232) (0.181) 
Governing board -1.595 0.054 -0.024 
 (1.135) (0.162) (0.126) 
Coordinating agency -1.812 0.054 -0.067 
 (1.199) (0.180) (0.110) 
Divided legislature 0.037 -0.029 -0.021 
 (0.040) (0.053) (0.066) 
    
Observations 539 435 435 
Number of states 49 48 48 
Number of instruments 26 27 32 
Year dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
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F-Statistic 13.06*** 7.30*** 3.01** 
    
Hansen J Statistic 17.47 15.78 14.93 
Arellano-Bond tests for    
   AR(1) in first differences (Z) -2.89*** -2.45** -1.50 
   AR(2) in first differences (Z) 0.38 0.11 0.21 
    
 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standard errors are in parentheses 
All continuous variables in this study are log transformed. All financial variables were 





Research Question 2 
 
Taking into account prior state appropriations to higher 
education, state characteristics, higher education governance 
systems, competing budget items, higher education interest 
groups, political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, 
divided legislature, and other unobservable variables, how do 
policy preferences influence state spending on higher 
education? 
 
 The second research question seeks to understand whether state 
legislator policy preferences influence state spending on higher education.  The 
overall model is significant [F(16, 47) = 7.30; p<.001] and the Hansen J 
statistic reveals that the instruments are valid and the exogenous variables are 
uncorrelated with the error term (χ2 = 15.78; p<.20).  Additionally, the test for 
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second-order serial correlation is not significant, indicating that the variable 
transformations have corrected for autocorrelation (Z = 2.59; p<.20).   
Similar to the findings from the first research question, prior 
appropriations to higher education, lagged one year, is positively related to 
current year appropriations to higher education (beta = 0.56; p<.001).  The 
share of enrollment in private higher education institutions is also statistically 
significant in this model (beta = -0.18; p<.05).  In particular, current year 
appropriations are negatively related to the share of enrollment in private 
institutions.  Therefore, as the share of enrollment in private higher education 
institutions increases, there is a decrease in state appropriations to higher 
education. 
The results of the model addressing the second research question also 
indicate that state legislator policy preferences are statistically significant (beta 
= -0.29; p<.01).  The negative coefficient indicates that current state 
appropriations to higher education are negatively related to state legislator 
policy preferences.  Specifically, the negative coefficient specifies that more 
liberal state legislator policy preferences positively influence state 
appropriations to higher education. Varying levels of state legislator policy 
preferences were also examined to depict how states with more liberal state 
legislator policy preferences, compared to states with more conservative state 
legislator policy preferences, influenced state appropriations to higher 
education.  Following the dynamic fixed-effects panel model with systems 
GMM techniques, marginal effects were analyzed to discern how various 
 106 
 
levels of state legislator policy preferences influenced state appropriations to 
higher education.  Table 4.3 portrays the marginal effects.  More conservative 
state legislator policy preferences are represented as the 25th percentile and 
more liberal state legislator policy preferences are represented as the 75th 
percentile.  Depicted in Table 4.3, states with more conservative state legislator 
policy preferences (25th percentile) are negatively influencing state 
appropriations to higher education (beta = 0.07; p<.01) while states with more 
liberal state legislator policy preferences (75th percentile) are positively 
influencing state appropriations to higher education (beta = -0.14; p<.01).   
 
Table 4.3. Estimated Marginal Effects of State Legislator Policy Preferences at the 25th, 
50th, and 75th Percentile from the dynamic fixed-effects panel analysis model (Research 
Question 2) in Table 2, 1998-2009. 




25th percentile  0.070** 
 (0.022) 
50th percentile  -0.060** 
 (0.019) 
75th percentile -0.140** 
 (0.044) 
 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standard errors are in parentheses.   
The standard errors are estimated using the delta-method, which treat the independent variables at which 
the dependent variable is evaluated as given or fixed (e.g., at the mean, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, etc.).  
 
 





Research Question 3 
 
Taking into account prior state appropriations to higher 
education, state characteristics, higher education governance 
systems, competing budget items, political party of the 
governors, gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and other 
unobservable variables, how do policy preferences varying 
with higher education interest groups influence state spending 
on higher education? 
 
The third research question seeks to understand whether state legislator policy 
preferences, interacting with higher education interest groups, influence state spending on 
higher education.  As shown in Table 4.2, the overall model is significant [F(21, 47) = 
3.01; p<.01].  Additionally, the Hansen J statistic shows that the instruments are valid 
and the exogenous variables are uncorrelated with the error term (χ2 = 14.93; p<.20).  As 
seen in the results for the first two research questions, the test for second-order serial 
correlation is significant, indicating that the variable transformations have corrected for 
autocorrelation (Z = 0.21; p < .90).   
The higher education interest group variable was transformed into four separate 
variables to examine whether state legislator policy preferences, interacting with higher 
education interest groups, influences state appropriations to higher education.  
Specifically, higher education interest group ratios were grouped into four quartiles: 
Quartile 1 reflects the lowest levels of higher education interest groups (states with higher 
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education interest group ratios in the bottom fourth relative to other states). Quartile 2 
represents states with higher education interest group ratios falling within the second to 
lowest group. Quartile 3 reflects states with higher education interest group ratios within 
the second to highest group relative to other states while Quartile 4 represents the states 
with the highest levels of higher education interest groups ratio.  Dummy variables were 
created to represent the quartiles of higher education interest groups.  Transforming 
higher education interest groups into quartiles allowed for an examination of how state 
legislator policy preferences, interacting with each of the quartiles of higher education 
interest groups, influence state appropriations to higher education.  The results of the 
model, as represented by the marginal effects in Table 4.4, show that state legislator 
policy preferences, interacting with higher education interest groups, do not have a 
statistically significant relationship, regardless of the level of higher education interest 












Table 4.4.Estimated Marginal Effects of Higher Education Interest Groups Interacting 
with State Legislator Policy Preferences Interacting at the 25th, 50th, and 75th Percentile 
from the dynamic fixed-effects panel analysis model (Research Question 3) in Table 2, 
1998-2009. 
Higher Education Interest Group Quartile * 
State Legislator Policy Preference Score 
Marginal 
Effects 
25th percentile * State Legislator Policy 
Preference Score 0.538 
 (0.348) 
50th percentile * State Legislator Policy 
Preference Score 0.762 
 (0.429) 
75th percentile* State Legislator Policy 
Preference Score 0.791 
 (0.430) 
 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; standard errors are in parentheses.   
The standard errors are estimated using the delta-method, which treat the independent variables at which 




 This chapter presents the results of the three research questions in this study.  The 
first research question seeks to examine the influence of prior state appropriations, state 
characteristics, higher education governance systems, competing budget items, higher 
education interest groups, political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided 
legislature, and other unobservable variables on state spending on higher education.  A 
dynamic fixed-effects panel model with system GMM techniques is utilized to address 
this question.  The findings presented in this chapter show that prior year appropriations 
to higher education, K-12 appropriations, and gubernatorial strength all influence current-
year state appropriations to higher education.  The second research question in this study 
examined the influence of state legislator policy preferences on state higher education 
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appropriations.  A dynamic fixed-effects panel model with system GMM techniques was 
utilized, and the findings suggest that state legislator policy preferences significantly 
influence state higher education appropriations.  Specifically, more liberal state legislator 
policy preferences positively influence state appropriations to higher education while 
more conservative state legislator policy preference negatively influence state 
appropriations to higher education.  The third research question seeks to understand how 
state legislator policy preferences, interacting with higher education interest groups, 
influence state appropriations to higher education.  The results indicate that state 
legislator policy preferences, interacting with various levels of higher education interest 
groups, are not statistically significant.  The following chapter will discuss these results 






















 Using the spatial theory of voting and advanced statistical techniques, this study 
examined the influence of state legislator policy preferences, higher education interest 
groups, and other variables on state funding to higher education.  The study addressed 
three research questions:   
1. How do prior state appropriations to higher education, 
state characteristics, higher education governance systems, 
competing budget items, higher education interest groups, 
political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided 
legislature, and other unobservable variables influence state 
spending on higher education? 
 
2. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
governance systems, competing budget items, higher education 
interest groups, political party of the governors, gubernatorial 
strength, divided legislature, and other unobservable variables, 
how do policy preferences influence state spending on higher 
education? 
 
3. Taking into account prior state appropriations to 
higher education, state characteristics, higher education 
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governance systems, competing budget items, political party of 
the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided legislature, and 
other unobservable variables, how do policy preferences 
varying with higher education interest groups influence state 
spending on higher education? 
 
This chapter will first provide a discussion of the results presented in chapter 4.  
The results will be compared with prior research examining state appropriations to higher 
education.  Next, this chapter will discuss contributions to the literature, conclusions, 
implications for theory and research, and recommendations for future research.   
 
Discussion of the Findings 
As depicted in chapter 4, prior appropriations to higher education are positively 
related to current year appropriations to higher education in all three models. 
Additionally, K-12 appropriations are positively related to state appropriations to higher 
education in the first model but not in the second and third models.  Another variable, 
gubernatorial strength, depicting the power of a state’s governor, is positively related to 
state appropriations to higher education in the first model.  The share of higher education 
enrollment in private institutions was found to be significant in the second model, but not 
in the first or third model. State-wide unemployment, Medicaid appropriations, prison 
appropriations, total enrollment in higher education, higher education interest groups, tax 
and expenditure limitation policies, political parties of the governor, higher education 
governance structures, and divided legislature have no statistically significant association 
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with state appropriations to higher education in any of the models. The variable depicting 
state legislator policy preferences is statistically significant while the interaction of state 
legislator policy preferences and higher education interest groups is insignificant.  The 
following section will compare the findings from this study to the results from prior 
research.   
 
Prior Appropriations to Higher Education 
 In this study, prior appropriations to higher education are positively related to 
current year appropriations to higher education.  This finding is consistent with previous 
studies portraying the statistically significant influence of prior year appropriations to 
higher education on current year appropriations (e.g., Hossler, Lund, Ramin, Tandberg, 
2008; Westfall, & Irish, 1997; Wildavsky, 1964).  In addition, this finding is consistent 
with the incremental budgeting approach states employ with respect to funding higher 




 Prior studies found that lower state unemployment rates were associated with  
higher levels of state appropriations to higher education (e.g., Dar & Spence, 2011; 
Humphreys, 2000; McLendon et al., 2009; Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998) while other 
researchers (e.g., Delaney & Doyle; Tandberg & Ness, 2011) found no relationship 
between unemployment rates and higher education funding.  This study did not find a 
significant relationship between states’ unemployment rates and state appropriations to 
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higher education, consistent with recent research by Delaney & Doyle (2011) and 
Tandberg & Ness (2011).   
 The lack of association between state unemployment rates and state 
appropriations to higher education may be due to the time period examined in this study.  
Unlike many prior studies, this dissertation examined state appropriations to higher 
education from 1998 – 2009.  During this time period, the average unemployment rate in 
the US was relatively stable, ranging from around 4% to 6%.  However, other studies 
included time periods with more unstable unemployment rates.  For example, 
Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) measured state appropriations that included time periods 
in the 1970’s through the early 1990’s when unemployment rates varied 5% to 10%.  
Similar to research by Delaney and Doyle (2011) and Tandberg and Ness (2011), this 
study examined a time period in the late 1990’s and early to mid-2000’s when 
unemployment rates were more stable.  Therefore, the lack of association between states’ 
unemployment rates and state appropriations to higher education may be due to the time 
period examined in this study.  
  Some recent studies showed that the presence of state tax and expenditure 
limitation policies negatively influenced state appropriations to higher education 
(Archibald & Feldman, 2006) while other studies showed no relationship (McLendon et 
al., 2009).  Similar to the research by McLendon et al., (2009), this study finds no 
relationship between state tax and expenditure limitation policies and state appropriations 
to higher education.  
The lack of association between state tax and expenditure limitation policies and 
state appropriations to higher education may also be influenced by the time period 
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examined within prior studies.  In the study by Archibald and Feldman (2006), the 
authors examined the influence of state tax and limitation policies on state appropriations 
to higher education from 1961 – 2001.  The study by McLendon et al., (2009), which 
found no relationship between state tax and expenditure limitation policies and higher 
education funding, examined the time period from 1984 – 2004 and this study utilized the 
timeframe from 1998 – 2009.  Because most states enacted tax and expenditure 
limitations in the late 1970’s it is not surprising that studies analyzing the timeframe 
before and after tax and expenditure limitations were enacted may find a statistically 
significant relationship (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2006).  Because this study examined 
state appropriations to higher education after the enactment of state tax and expenditure 
limitations, it is not unexpected to find an insignificant relationship between tax and 
expenditure limitations and state appropriations to higher education.   
 A number of prior studies found a positive association between total state higher 
education enrollments and state appropriations to higher education (Clotfelter, 1976; 
Delaney & Doyle, 2011; Hossler, 1997; Peterson, 1976; Weerts, 2002) while Leslie & 
Ramey (1986) found a relationship between state appropriations to higher education and 
total enrollments only within certain states.  Results from other studies show no 
statistically significant relationship between total state enrollments in higher education 
and state appropriations (Dar, 2012; Tandberg & Ness, 2011).  Similar to the research by 
Dar (2012) and Tandberg and Ness (2011), the results of this study show no relationship 




 There are a few potential reasons why the association between total state higher 
education enrollments and state appropriations to higher education was insignificant in 
this study.  First, total state higher education enrollments were measured per capita within 
this study, while other researchers used the absolute value of higher education 
appropriations or the percentage of higher education funding relative to other state budget 
items (Clotfelter, 1976; Delaney & Doyle, 2011; Hossler, 1997; Peterson, 1976; Weerts, 
2002).  Second, this study examined multiple states over multiple years, whereas many 
studies finding a significant association between total enrollments in higher education 
and state appropriations to higher education examined only one state or only examined a 
few years (e.g., Clotfelter, 1976; Peterson, 1976).  Therefore, the insignificant 
relationship found between state appropriations to higher education and total enrollments 
in higher education is likely due to how higher education appropriations are measured 
and the number of states and years examined within the study. 
 Recent studies examined the association between the share of higher education 
enrollment in private institutions and state appropriations to higher education (Dar & 
Spence, 2011; Delaney & Doyle, 2011; McLendon et al., 2009).  The results of these 
studies show that as the share of enrollment in private institutions increases, state 
appropriations to higher education decreases.  The results of the second research question 
in this study affirm prior findings that state appropriations to higher education is 






Higher Education Governance Systems 
 A number of scholars examined the effect of higher education governance 
structures on state appropriations to higher education.  Some studies found appropriations 
to higher education are related to higher education governance structures (e.g., Lowry, 
2001; Tandberg & Ness; 2011; Weerts, 2002) whereas other studies found no association 
(e.g., Delaney & Doyle, 2011; McLendon et al., 2009).  Within this study, state 
appropriations to higher education were not related to higher education governance 
structures.   
 The lack of association between state appropriations to higher education and 
higher education governance structures may be due to the time period examined in this 
study. Specifically, few states had a change in higher education governance structures 
during the time period examined in this study. Comparable to the research by McLendon 
et al. (2009), the consistency of governance structures found within this study is likely 
influencing the lack of association between higher education governance structures and 
state appropriations to higher education.   
 
Competing Budget Items 
 A number of studies have examined whether other state budget items influence 
state appropriations to higher education.  In particular, many scholars analyzed how K-12 
appropriations within a state influence higher education appropriations (Delaney & 
Doyle, 2007; Kane, Orszag, & Apostolov, 2005; Okunade, 2004).  Some studies found 
that higher education appropriations (e.g., Kane, Irszag, & Apostolov, 2005; Okunade, 
2004) are related to K-12 education appropriations while other researchers concluded that 
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there is no statistical relationship (e.g., Delaney & Doyle, 2007).  In this study, the results 
of the first model show that K-12 appropriations are related to higher education 
appropriations: as K-12 appropriations increase, state spending on higher education 
decreases.  However, after including the variable representing state legislator policy 
preferences in the second and third model, K-12 funding was found to be unrelated to 
state appropriations to higher education. 
 In the first model, higher education appropriations was related to K-12 
appropriations, a finding that is consistent with prior research that included a similar 
group of independent variables (e.g., Kane, Irszag, & Apostolov, 2005; Okunade, 2004).  
However, when including political variables such as state legislator policy preferences, 
the relationship was insignificant.  Though K-12 appropriations and the political variables 
are not correlated (Appendix: Table A1), it is likely to that the inclusion of political 
variables is absorbing the variability of K-12 appropriations resulting in an insignificant 
relationship between K-12 appropriations and higher education appropriations.    
 Medicaid appropriations have also been examined in prior researchers to 
understand whether Medicaid appropriations influence state spending to higher education 
(e.g., Grogan, 1994; Kane, Orszag, & Apostolov, 2005; Okunade, 2004; Tandberg & 
Ness, 2011).  Some scholars found a significant association (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 
2006; Kane, Orszag, and Apostolov, 2005; Okunade, 2004) while others have found no 
relationship between Medicaid appropriations and state funding to higher education (e.g., 
Tandberg & Ness, 2011).  This study had comparable results to recent research conducted 
by Tandberg and Ness (2011), finding no statistically significant association between 
higher education appropriations and Medicaid appropriations.   
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 Unlike the studies by Kane, Orszag, and Apostolov (2005) and Okunade (2004), 
this study did not find a statistically significant association between Medicaid 
appropriations and higher education appropriations.  The insignificant association is 
likely due to the unique technique employed in this study.  Within this study, a dynamic 
fixed-effects panel model with GMM techniques was employed to measure higher 
education funding across multiple states over a number of years.  Prior research 
investigating the influence of Medicaid appropriations on state funding to higher 
education did not utilize an advanced econometric technique that appropriately included 
multiple states over multiple years (e.g., Kane, Orszag, and Apostolov, 2005; Okunade, 
2004).  Therefore, the lack of association between Medicaid funding and higher 
education funding is likely due to the advanced technique employed in this dissertation.  
 Previous scholars have examined whether state appropriations to higher education 
are related to prison expenditures.  Some scholars found a statistically a significant 
association between prison expenditures and state appropriations to higher education 
(e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Okunade, 2004) while other researchers found no 
association (e.g., Dar & Spence, 2011; Delaney & Doyle; 2011; Tandberg, 2010). Similar 
to the research by Dar and Spence (2011), Delaney and Doyle (2011) and Tandberg 
(2010), the results of this study found no statistically significant relationship between 
prison expenditures and state appropriations to higher education. 
  
Political Variables 
 A few recent studies examining state appropriations to higher education have 
sought to understand the influence of higher education interest groups on state 
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appropriations to higher education.  In one study, McLendon et al. (2009) found that as 
the ratio of higher education interest groups within a state increased, relative to other 
interest groups, state appropriations to higher education increased.  Tandberg (2008, 
2010) and Tandberg and Ness (2011) also found that state appropriations to higher 
education increased as the ratio of higher education interest groups within a state 
increased.   
Within this study, no statistically significant association exists between state 
appropriations to higher education and higher education interest groups. The difference in 
findings between this study and prior research may be attributed to a few factors.  First, 
this study used an updated measure of higher education interest groups which included 
interest group data through 2009 where previous studies included data through 2004 
(McLendon et al, 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010; Tandberg & Ness, 2011).  Second, this 
study examined the influence of higher education interest groups on state appropriations 
to higher education from 1998 – 2009, which constitutes a different time periods 
compared to earlier research.  Third, this study utilized a methodological approach that 
was not employed in prior studies examining the influence of higher education interest 
groups on state appropriations to higher education.  Fourth, measuring higher education 
interest groups in a different manner may yield alternative results.  Though this study 
considered the ratio of higher education interest groups in a state compared to all other 
interest groups, it did not consider the strength of the higher education interest groups. 
Therefore, updated measures of higher education interest groups, the timeframe examined 
in this study, and an alternative method not employed in previous research all may have 
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influenced the different conclusions found regarding the influence of higher education 
interest groups on state appropriations to higher education.  
 Certain past studies investigating state appropriations to higher education have 
included an independent variable measuring the political party of the governor (e.g., 
Delaney & Doyle, 2011; McLendon et al., 2009; Rizzo, 2006; Tandberg & Ness, 2011).  
McLendon et al., (2009) and Rizzo (2006) found that Republican governors were 
associated with lower funding levels to higher education while Delaney and Doyle (2011) 
and Tandberg and Ness (2011) found no relationship between the party of the governor 
and state appropriations to higher education.  Within this study, no statistically significant 
relationship was found between the political party of the governor and state 
appropriations to higher education.   
 One reason that might explain the statistical insignificance of the political parties 
of the governor on state funding for higher education is that state legislators are the 
political actors deciding funding levels for various state budget items, including higher 
education funding. Governors, on the other hand, do not typically shape the funding 
levels of higher education appropriations.  Therefore, the insignificant relationship 
between the political party of the governor and state appropriations to higher education is 
unsurprising.   
 A different variable in this study, gubernatorial strength, is related to state 
appropriations to higher education within the first model, but not within the second and 
third models.  Specifically, the first model in this study shows that lower state 
appropriations to higher education are associated with more powerful governors.  Prior 
research confirms the result found in the first model that lower funding levels to higher 
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education (e.g., Peterson, 1976; McLendon et al., 2009; Tandberg & Ness, 2011) are 
associated with powerful governors.  However, this variable is insignificant when state 
legislator policy preferences are introduced in the second and third models.  Although 
gubernatorial strength is not statistically correlated with state legislator policy preferences 
(Appendix: Table A1), it is likely that the variability of gubernatorial strength is being 
absorbed by state legislator policy preferences in the second and third models.  
 This study also analyzed whether a divided or unified state legislature influenced 
state appropriations to higher education.  As shown in Chapter 4, no statistically 
significant association was found between state appropriations to higher education and a 
divided legislature.  Prior studies have shown mixed results in regards to whether a 
divided legislature influences state appropriations to higher education.  In particular, 
Tandberg and Ness (2011) found no association while Tandberg (2008, 2010) found that 
unified legislatures have a negative influence on state funding to higher education.   
Overall, this study confirms the most recent results by Tandberg and Ness (2011), finding 
no significant association exists between state funding for higher education and a divided 
legislature.  
A variable depicting state legislator policy preferences was included in this study 
and found to be related to state appropriations to higher education.  As shown in Chapter 
4 and looking at the distribution state legislature policy preferences at the 25th, 50th and 
75th percentile, states with more conservative state legislator policy preferences 
negatively influenced state appropriations to higher education while states with more 
liberal state legislator policy preferences positively influenced state appropriations to 
higher education.  Therefore, a more conservative state legislature, depicted as the 25th 
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percentile, was associated with the lowest levels of higher education funding while a 
more liberal state legislature, depicted as the 75th percentile, was associated with the 
highest levels of higher education funding. Though prior scholars utilized different 
variables to measure state legislator policy preferences, this finding aligns with previous 
findings.  In particular, McLendon et al., (2009) found that conservative state legislatures 
were associated with lower levels of state funding to higher education. Similarly, 
Tandberg (2010) found that more liberal state legislatures, as measured as the percent of 
Democratic legislators, were associated with higher levels of state funding to higher 
education.  Although prior studies found that policy preferences were related to state 
appropriations to higher education, a less accurate measure for policy preferences was 
used.  Specifically, Dar (2012) and McLendon et al. (2009) utilized measures of policy 
preferences based of off members of the US Congress and Tandberg (2010) measured the 
relative percentage of state legislators that were Democrats vs. Republicans. Because this 
dissertation utilized direct measures of legislator preferences, rather than proxies, this 
finding notably advances prior research on this topic.  Moreover, this significant finding 
regarding the influence of state legislator policy preferences on higher education funding 
aligns with the central concept of the spatial theory of voting guiding this study: 
legislators evaluate policy alternatives and vote for policies aligning with their personal 
preferences. Overall, the findings of this study portray that more liberal state legislator 
policy preferences are associated with higher levels of higher education funding while 
more conservative state legislator policy preferences are associated with lower levels of 
higher education funding.  
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State legislator policy preference scores, interacting with higher education interest 
groups, were not found to be significant in this study.  As explained earlier, higher 
education interest groups are not related to higher education funding.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that higher education interest groups, interacting with state legislator policy 
preferences was not statistically significant.  
  
Contributions to the Literature 
 This dissertation provides three major contributions to the literature in higher 
education and political science.  First, this study connects a theoretical framework from 
the field of political science to the higher education literature.  Prior research analyzing 
higher education funding has utilized frameworks such as the median voter theorem (e.g., 
Clotfelter, 1976; Doyle, 2007; Tandberg & Ness, 2011; Toutkoushian & Hollis, 1998), 
new institutionalism (e.g., Alt & Lowry, 1994; McLendon et al., 2009; Rizzo, 2004), and 
the state fiscal policy framework (e.g., Tandberg, 2008, 2010). However, no prior studies 
within political science or higher education have utilized the spatial theory of voting to 
guide research on state appropriations to higher education.  Thus, the application of the 
spatial theory of voting in this study adds another theoretical framework to the higher 
education and political science literature.   
 Second, this dissertation utilizes a newly developed variable, state legislator 
policy preferences, which has not been examined in prior higher education research. 
Previous studies in higher education have been using a proxy to understand the policy 
preferences of state legislators (e.g., Dar, 2012; Dar & Spence, 2011; McLendon et al., 
2009; Tandberg, 2010; Tandberg & Ness, 2011).  However, this newly developed 
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variable by Shor and McCarty (2011) more accurately depicts the policy preferences of 
state legislators. Moreover, because the variable depicting state legislator policy 
preferences was only recently developed, few studies in other disciplines have utilized 
these new measures of state legislator policy preferences (e.g., McGhee et al., 2014; 
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2013).  Overall, this dissertation showcases the use of a new 
political variable depicting state legislator policy preferences to investigate state 
appropriations to higher education.  
 Third, this dissertation employs an advanced econometric technique that has been 
utilized in only one other higher education study by Titus (2009).  Moreover, dynamic 
fixed-effects panel modeling with Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) techniques 
has not been used in any studies examining higher education funding. As explained in 
Chapter 3, a dynamic fixed-effects panel model combined with GMM techniques is the 
most appropriate technique to assess how prior levels of state appropriations to higher 
education, along with other independent variables, influence current appropriations to 
higher education.  Recent quantitative studies examining state appropriations to higher 
education have typically employed panel data techniques.  Overall, this dissertation 
provides a detailed description of the use of a dynamic fixed-effects panel model with 
GMM estimating techniques to examine the influence of prior appropriations to higher 








 There are at least four conclusions that can be drawn from this study.  First, the 
spatial theory of voting, a theory never utilized in the field of higher education, helps 
guides studies examining the influence of political influences on state appropriations to 
higher education.  Specifically, the results of this study validate the central construct of 
the spatial theory of voting: legislators evaluate policy alternatives and make policy 
decisions based on their own preferences (Enelow & Hinich, 1984).  In particular, the 
theory utilized in this study helps guide the selection of political variables in this study 
and explain the association between policy preferences and higher education funding. 
 Second, this study utilized newly developed measures of policy preferences to 
determine that that state appropriations to higher education are influenced by state 
legislator policy preferences.  This is an important finding, given that a number of prior 
studies utilized proxies for state legislator policy preferences developed by Berry et al., 
(2010) rather than direct, more accurate, measures of legislator policy preferences (e.g., 
Archibald & Feldman, 2006; Dar, 2012; McLendon et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2010; 
Tandberg & Ness, 2011).  Recently, Berry et al. (2010) wrote, “If valid direct measures 
of state citizen and government ideology eventually become available for the 50 states 
over a sufficient period of years, we would certainly favor using them over BRFH’s less 
direct proxies” (Berry et al. 2010).  Furthermore, this study expanded previous research 
investigating the influence of policy preferences on higher education funding by 
examining the influence of varying levels of state legislator policy preferences on state 
funding for higher education.  In particular, this study showed how more liberal state 
legislator policy preferences were associated with higher levels of state appropriations to 
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higher education while more conservative state legislator policy preferences were 
associated with lower funding levels to higher education. Overall, this study utilized a 
newly developed, direct measure of legislator policy preferences to explain the significant 
relationship between state legislator policy preferences on state appropriations to higher 
education.   
Third, there is no evidence of a significant relationship between state legislator 
policy preferences, interacting with higher education interest groups, on state 
appropriations to higher education from 1998 to 2009.  Because the variable representing 
the interaction of state legislator policy preferences and higher education interest groups 
is insignificant, changes in state appropriations to higher education may not be due to 
varying levels of higher education interests groups interacting with state legislator policy 
preferences.  
 Fourth, this study demonstrates that advanced statistical methods can be used to 
examine the predictors of state appropriations to higher education.  In particular, this 
dissertation utilized dynamic fixed-effects panel modeling with GMM estimating 
techniques to accurately examine the influence of prior year appropriations to higher 
education, state characteristics, higher education governance systems, competing budget 
items, divided legislature, political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength state 
legislator policy preferences, and higher education interest groups on state funding to 
higher education.  In summary, the results of this study affirm that research on higher 
education funding should be investigated using sophisticated quantitative methods to 
appropriately examine how of state appropriations to higher education is influenced by a 
number of independent variables.  
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Implications for Theory, Research, and Policy 
 The results of this dissertation offer a number of implications. The next session of 
this chapter will discuss the implications for theory, research and policy and provide 
recommendations for future research on state appropriations to higher education.   
 
Implications for Theory 
 This study is distinct in that it utilizes a theory from political science to examine 
the influence of political variables on state appropriations to higher education.  In 
particular, the spatial theory of voting appropriately guides the selection of political 
variables to examine the influence of state legislator policy preferences on state 
appropriations to higher education.  Variables depicting state characteristics, higher 
education governance structures, and competing budget items were also included in this 
study due to their significance in prior research examining state funding to higher 
education.  In total, a broader conceptual framework, which includes the spatial theory of 
voting along with significant variables from prior research was utilized in this study to 
examine the influence of prior state appropriations to higher education, state 
characteristics, higher education governance systems, competing budget items, higher 
education interest groups, political party of the governors, gubernatorial strength, divided 
legislature, and other unobservable variables on state appropriations to higher education.  
Thus, the spatial theory of voting is an appropriate theory to guide studies seeking to 
understand the influence of political variables, such as state legislator policy preferences, 
on state funding to higher education.  However, including significant variables from other 
research, along with the spatial theory of voting to guide the selection of political 
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variables, can be employed to construct a conceptual framework for future research 
examining state funding to higher education.  
 Because the spatial of theory appropriately guided this study examining the 
influence of state legislator policy preferences on higher education funding, this theory 
can be applied to other research topics.  Studies investigating other state budget items, 
such as Medicaid appropriations or K-12 appropriations can employ the spatial theory of 
voting to examine the influence of state legislator policy preferences on other budget 
items.  Additionally, the spatial theory of voting can be utilized to examine the influence 
of state legislator policy preferences on other state policy outcomes.  Overall, this study 
showed how the spatial theory of voting can be employed in other studies examining state 
legislator policy on policy outcomes.  
 
Implications for Research 
 Within this study, prior year appropriations to higher education, is included as a 
lag of the dependent variable, current year appropriations to higher education.  Dynamic 
fixed-effects panel models with GMM estimating techniques are recommended when a 
lag of the dependent variable is included as an independent variable (Arellano & Bond, 
1991; Curs, Bhandari, & Steiger, 2011; Titus, 2009).  Therefore, dynamic fixed-effects 
panel modeling with GMM techniques may be a viable option in other studies including a 
lag of the dependent variable as an independent variable. 
 This study also shows the effectiveness of utilizing newly developed measures of 
policy preferences to understand the influence of state legislator policy preferences on 
state appropriations to higher education.  The dataset compiled by Shor and McCarty 
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(2011) represents a vast improvement over prior datasets representing state legislator 
policy preferences.  Given this advancement in measuring state legislator policy 
preferences, future studies can include this variable to accurately examine the influence 
of state legislator policy preferences on a variety of state policy outcomes.  Additionally, 
this study portrayed how varying levels of state legislator policy preferences influenced 
state appropriations to higher education.  Thus, future research can continue to examine 
how more liberal state legislators compared to more conservative state legislators 
influence different policy outcomes.   
 
Implications for Policy 
 This dissertation showed that a number of variables influence state funding to 
higher education.  An understanding of the influencers of higher education appropriations 
will allow policymakers and administrators to more accurately predict future higher 
education funding levels.  If policymakers and administrators are better able to forecast 
higher education funding levels, they may attempt to influence policy outcomes to better 
meet their funding objectives. However, because this is an initial study examining the 
political influences of higher education funding, implications for policy should be taken 
cautiously.  Future research can expand upon the preliminary findings in this study and 
offer additional implications for policy.  
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This study builds upon the higher education literature by employing a theory that 
has not been utilized in previous higher education literature.  Moreover, the quantitative 
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method utilized in this study has only been employed in one prior higher education study 
(Titus, 2009).  Building on this study, future research could be expanded by examining 
other types of political variables, other forms of state support for higher education, 
further exploring the influence of state legislator policy preferences on state 
appropriations to higher education, and examining how political factors influence funding 
in a few specific states.  The next section of will detail the recommended areas for future 
research.  
 A number of recent higher education studies have examined the influence of 
political variables on state appropriations to higher education (e.g., Dar, 2011; McLendon 
et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010; Tandberg & Ness, 2011).  Although this study 
advanced the literature by including new political variable, state legislator policy 
preferences, there are other political variables that warrant consideration in future 
research.  For example, future research should examine whether political variables such 
as term limits, gubernatorial policy preferences, legislative professionalism, and 
polarization influence state appropriations to higher education.  
 Within this study the dependent variable was represented as state appropriations 
to higher education per capita.  However, other potential dependent variables can be used 
in future research to understand the influencers of higher education funding.  For 
example, higher education appropriations, as the relative share of state funding to all 
budget items, can be examined future research.  Another potential dependent variable is 
state appropriations per full-time enrollee in higher education.  Therefore, future research 
can potentially examine how different measures of higher education funding are related 
to state demographic characteristics, competing budget items, and political variables.   
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 This study examined whether higher education interest groups influenced state 
appropriations to higher education.  Though no statistical significance was found, there 
may be different ways to measure higher education interest groups in future research to 
more accurately assess their relative strength.  Future studies might consider examining 
the size of the higher education interest groups within a state or their relative strength, 
compared to other interest groups within the a state.  Thus, future research should 
consider alternative measures of higher education interest groups to determine their 
influence on state funding to higher education.   
This dissertation examined the influence of state legislator policy preferences on state 
appropriations to higher education.  However, this study did not examine how state 
legislator policy preferences influenced state appropriations to higher education within 
different states.  Understanding differing effects of state legislator policy preferences for 
different states can be studied in future literature to portray differences across states.  For 
example, examining how political factors influenced state funding for higher education in 
New Jersey compared to California may provide further explanation of how political 
influences vary from state to state. Further, this studied analyzed the time period from 
1998 – 2009.  Ideally, future research should examine how state legislator policy 
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